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10 Sharia and national law inIndonesia
Jan Michiel Otto1
Abstract
This chapter adresses the relationship between sharia and na-
tional law in Indonesia. The historical sections 10.1-10.4 examine
the (pre)colonial pluralities of law, and subsequently relate how
Indonesia has accommodated sharia in its laws, administration,
and court system, from independence in 1945 until today. The sec-
tions 10.5-10.8 pay attention to the law presently in force. While
the constitution does not mention Islam explicitly, the govern-
ment is keen to coordinate religious affairs and prevent excesses.
The Ministry of Religion plays an important role in this respect.
Religious Courts, as branches of the national judiciary, mainly hear
marital disputes, but have recently been given jurisdiction in eco-
nomic matters as well. The Marriage Act of 1974 is the main sha-
ria-based law; in its provisions Indonesia has kept a significant
distance from the patriarchal norms of classical sharia. In 1991,
an official Compilation of Islamic Law, drafted by scholars and
judges, was promulgated. It contains three chapters – on mar-
riage, inheritance, and religious endowments – which, beside the
law, should serve as main reference for the Religious Courts. In
the province of Aceh, with its special autonomy, sharia-based law
also extends to certain criminal offences.
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The Republic of Indonesia (1945) has a population of approximately 235
million people. It is the world’s most populous Muslim country. The
Indonesian archipelago is inhabited by many ethnic groups, the largest being
the Javanese, who occupy the densely populated island of Java along with
other ethnic groups, such as the Sundanese (West Java) and the Madurese
(East Java). Muslims – primarily Sunnis – make up 86 per cent of the
population. Other recognised religions are Protestantism (6%), Roman
Catholicism (3%), Hinduism (2%), and Buddhism (1%). Virtually everyone
in Indonesia speaks the official language, Bahasa Indonesia, although the
many ethnic groups in the archipelago also have their own languages.
(Source: Bartleby 2010)
10.1 The period until 1920
Sharia and scholars between three fires2
Islam reached Indonesia around the thirteenth century through the in-
fluence of traders coming from India (Ricklefs 1981: 3-13). At that time,
the archipelago was made up of various kingdoms, which at times coop-
erated with one another, but at other times went through periods of
great conflict and warfare. Many centuries earlier, Indian traders had
brought Hinduism to Java, which was to affect religion, culture, and the
form of government for a long time (De Graaf 1949: 21). Hinduism in-
fluenced primarily the large states that emerged from central Java,
namely Majapahit in the fourteenth century and Mataram in the fif-
teenth and sixteenth centuries.
These princely states were relatively well-developed with distinct so-
cial, political, and legal institutions (Ball 1981: 1-2). But Islam increased
in its importance, spreading slowly but surely from settlements in the
northern coastal regions of Java to the hinterland. Consequently, the
Islamic religion, including the Islamic jurisprudence of the Shafi’ite
school, blended with the religion, politics, and legal practices in the
princely courts. A certain degree of fusion also took place between
Islamic norms and the local customs and law-ways (adat law)3 in rural
areas (Lev 1972: 5). During the sixteenth century, the sultans of
Yogyakarta and Solo converted to Islam. In their islamised principali-
ties, they began to appoint, alongside a prime minister and a military
commander, a religious scholar (panghulu), who was to be responsible
for religious affairs, including the administration of Islamic justice
(Cammack 2003: 114-115; Hisyam 2001).
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The Dutch East India Company
In 1596, Dutch merchant ships arrived in search of spices. Initially, the
Dutch East India Company (VOC), a powerful mercantile corporation,
operated from small trading stations along the coast. For the Europeans
living there, it established a comprehensive legal system based on
Dutch models. With regard to the indigenous population, initially no
colonial legal policy was deliberately pursued. In fact, only in 1747 –
some one hundred and fifty years later – did the Company’s Governor-
General establish by decree the first court for the indigenous population
of Java. The court, based in Semarang, was called the ‘Landraad’. It was
chaired by a colonial administrator, and a few religious scholars (pang-
hulus) were attached to it as advisers (Burns 1999: 61; Hisyam 2001).
The management of the VOC itself was rather uninterested and ignor-
ant about indigenous legal systems (Ball 1981: 17-25). This became clear
when the VOC ordered various compendia of indigenous law to be
drafted. Instead of accurate representations of the complex blending of
adat law, Islamic law, and Javanese royal decrees that applied in prac-
tice, the colonial authorities clung to fallacious, one-sided assumptions;
for example, it was wrongly assumed that the Islamic population was
fully subject to religious, Islamic law only.4
The colonial state and sharia
When the VOC went bankrupt in 1800 and the Netherlands East-Indies
were transferred to the Dutch state, the era of full colonial administra-
tion began. From the outset, colonial policy had consistently placed a
central emphasis on maintaining a budget surplus (batig slot), but after
1800 the Dutch became increasingly concerned with the political and
socio-economic situation in the colony. Influenced by events in Europe
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the colonial government
also took its legislative duties more seriously.5 A ‘proto-constitution’ was
drafted and brought into force as early as 1803, calling for respect of in-
digenous laws, customs, and institutions (Burns 1999: 62; Ball 1982:
80). Under the leadership of General Daendels (1808-1811) and during
the short interim period of British rule under Raffles (1811-1816), more
territories on Java were brought under colonial rule. A dualist, yet co-
herent, administrative hierarchy was established, made up of Dutch ci-
vil servants on the one hand, and indigenous officials on the other
hand. More courts were established for the indigenous population – still
called Landraad – and presided over by high colonial officials called ‘re-
sident’, who were regional administrators. When a dispute between
Muslims was brought before the Landraad, the panghulu served as an
adviser regarding Islamic laws. However, his opinion was often
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disregarded because panghulus tended to cite primarily religious laws,
regardless of whether or not these were applied in practice (Ball 1981:
69).
From around 1812, resistance against foreign domination started
growing on Java. This resulted in the Java War (1825-1830), which in
the end was won by the Dutch. Now colonial exploitation began in earn-
est (Ricklefs 1981: 111). The government implemented a repressive colo-
nial agricultural policy that obliged Javanese farmers to use a set portion
of their lands for the cultivation of crops for the colonial government,
the so-called Cultivation System (Cultuurstelsel). Through this system
the Dutch generated enormous wealth. Despite specific regulations call-
ing for recognition of indigenous legal systems and the protection of lo-
cal communities against abuses, colonial law served generally as an in-
strument for the government’s extractive policy.
During this period, no satisfactory overall policy was made for the co-
lonial administration of justice. As a consequence, also the position of
the sharia remained unclear and ambiguous. The general ignorance of
the Dutch East-Indies government with regard to adat and Islamic laws
continued (Ball 1981: 35). Furthermore, according to a royal decree from
1830, the codified legislation of the Netherlands had to be applied in
the Netherlands Indies to the extent possible (De Smidt 1990: 17-18).
Thus, on 1 May 1848, ten major laws were brought into force in the col-
ony, modelled after the innovative codifications of 1838 in the
Netherlands. An ‘Act on General Provisions of Legislation’ divided the
population into two groups: first, the Europeans and those with equal
legal status; and, secondly, the natives and those with equal legal status
(Art. 6). At first, all Christians were considered equal to the Europeans.
The second category of natives and those with equal status included
‘the Arabs, the Moors, the Chinese’ as well as all others who were
‘Mohammedans or Heathens’. While the codified civil and commercial
legislation applied in principle to the Europeans, the native population
was subject to ‘the religious laws, social institutions and customs, inso-
far as these do not conflict with the generally recognised principles of
fairness and justice’ (Dekker & Van Katwijk 1993: 11-13). In 1854, the
Netherlands Indies ‘constitution’ (Regeringsreglement) was promulgated;
it further substantiated these provisions in Article 75(3).
The principle of legal dualism was by no means absolute. Indeed in
public law there was a strong tendency towards unification. In 1867 a
criminal code for Europeans was enacted, followed in 1873 by one for
non-Europeans. Yet, the substance of both codes was identical, and as
of 1918 all population groups would become subject to one unified
criminal code. In 1879 labour law was also unified. But, in most mat-
ters of private law, legal dualism continued to prevail. When putting
this system into practice, the colonial rulers were faced with the
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question of what these religious laws, social institutions, and customs
actually came down to, and which agencies should be tasked with apply-
ing them. In the Dutch institutes where indigenous law was studied
and taught to future colonial officials, the focus lay in discovering and
finding ‘Muhammadan law’ (Otto et al. 1994: 732). Salomon Keijzer, a
scholar of Islamic studies who lectured at the Royal Academy for colo-
nial civil servants in Delft, argued that pure Islamic law should serve as
the main reference in any attempt to understand the laws of the indi-
genous population. A colleague of his, the jurist L.W.C. van den Berg,
described the indigenous laws on Java and Madura as ‘deviations’ from
Islamic law.6
In 1882, the colonial government decided to formalise and regulate
the existing administration of Islamic justice, and, as such, enacted an
ordinance on the procedural law of Religious Councils, popularly
known as the ‘Council Agama’.7 Thus, the colonial government put to-
gether non-salaried religious officials, led by a panghulu, in these coun-
cils and granted them jurisdiction over marriage, divorce, and inheri-
tance, as well as over religious endowments (wakaf) (Noer 1978: 43).
The council applied Islamic law. The religious scholars and other mem-
bers of the council were now no longer appointed by the native ruler in
their districts, but by the Dutch resident. The decisions of the Religious
Council could only be executed following approval by the Landraad,
which continued to be the main state court for the native population.
Such ratification was in many, if not most, cases withheld, effectively re-
legating the status of the Religious Council to little more than an advi-
sory body (Hooker 2003: 13). Despite the council’s formal jurisdiction
to decide on marital issues according to Islamic law, colonial legislators
enacted the Mixed Marriages Ordinance of 1898, which decreed that
Muslim women were allowed to marry non-Muslims. This measure,
which conflicted directly with the prevailing interpretations of the sha-
ria, was to remain in force until 1974.
The panghulus saw themselves placed ‘between three fires’: God, the
colonial government, and local communities (Hisyam 2001). In prac-
tice, they cast themselves as mediators between the latter two groups,
the government being keen to use their services. Some new Muslim
movements, however, depicted the Religious Councils as corrupt and
‘lackeys of the non-believers’. In addition, doubts were increasingly
placed on their alleged expertise, by both the nascent Muslim move-
ments and the colonial government itself, which had imposed certain
standards precisely for this purpose. At the same time, other informal
religious scholars began to gain prominence. Under the auspices of the
Sultan of Yogyakarta, from 1905 some panghulus established their own
Islamic schools (madrasahs) employing modern methods to educate
staff for the Religious Councils. Eventually, madrasahs supported by
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new Muslim associations (see below) would spread across the island of
Java.
Legislative policies, adat law and sharia in the late colonial state
Around 1900, various colonial administrators and scholars proposed
the replacement of the existing legal dualism with a system of uniform
private law codes based on the Dutch model for all inhabitants. They
were of the opinion that the religious and customary laws were a source
of legal uncertainty and that the corpus of different laws for different
population groups created confusion (Ball 1981: 43). Others, however,
believed that it would be wrong to apply the laws of the Dutch minority
to the native majority, as it had its own laws. After a long political and
academic struggle, the latter succeeded in convincing the Dutch parlia-
ment and government to stick to the pluralistic system and retain the
indigenous law of the natives, rejecting proposals for the full unification
of private laws. Around the turn of the century, adat law – Indonesia’s
version of customary law – became the key concept in the colonial ana-
lysis of indigenous laws. The first person to use the concept of ‘adat-
law’ – in 1893 – was Snouck Hurgronje, an expert of Islam, Arabic and
Indonesian languages and cultures.8 Jurists, and one legal scholar in
particular, the young law professor Cornelis van Vollenhoven who
taught in Leiden (1901-1933), further developed this concept. To him
and his many students and supporters, the recognition of adat law was
the main objective of the so-called Ethical Policy initiative (1901). He ar-
gued in favour of extended indigenous land rights of native commu-
nities and protection from land grabbing by European and Chinese en-
trepreneurs. Much of the political and legal debates and literature on
adat law deals with these issues of land tenure security.
However, in the context of Islamic legal development, the promotion
of adat law could also be regarded as a deliberate effort to undermine
Islamic law. Indeed, when Snouck Hurgronje coined the term, he hap-
pened to be involved in preparing a government strategy to address the
rebellious, fervently Islamic, province of Aceh. In his opinion, the trans-
formation of Islam and Islamic law into political factors had to be sty-
mied, not only in Aceh, but throughout the colony. However, while it is
true that in his view political Islam had to be resisted, he also argued
that Islamic law should not be prevented from playing a role in regulat-
ing the private relations of Muslims. After 1900, Snouck Hurgronje
worked in close collaboration with Van Vollenhoven who, assisted by
dozens of field researchers and PhD students, scientifically developed,
elaborated, recorded, and promoted the colony’s customary law. As said,
adat law was most important in the ‘ethical’ struggle for land tenure se-
curity, fitting in a new policy emphasis on the welfare and well-being of
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the indigenous population. Its key characteristic was that its norms
were actually applied by local communities; thus, adat law was living
law. As a consequence, it was reasoned that adat law would include only
those norms of ‘customary law’, of ‘princely decrees’, and of ‘religious
law’ that were actively practiced by the community.
The principle that sharia norms were considered the law in force only
in as far they applied in practice – thus belonging to the living adat law
– became known among legal scholars in Indonesia as the ‘reception
theory’.9 This theory, however, was considered by orthodox and nation-
alist Muslims as a symbol of the subjugation of Islamic law to adat law.
They accused the Dutch of engaging in divide-and-rule politics and of
misusing the fact that adat laws differed from one place to another.
Moreover, the repressive ‘pacification’ of Aceh reinforced both national-
ist and Muslim resistance. As a consequence of these sentiments, var-
ious large Islamic popular movements were founded. In 1911, the
‘Muhammadiyah’ was established. In 1912, the Islam Association
(Sarekat Islam) followed, which would later be surpassed in importance
by the NU established in 1926 (Nahdatul Ulama, lit. ‘the awakening of
the scholars’). The NU had its roots in the Islamic schools that taught
sharia (Van Dijk 1988: 37-38). In 1923, an organisation of ‘orthodox’
Islamic intellectuals called ‘Persis’ (Persatuan Islam, lit. Islamic
Unification) was created (Hooker 2003: 28-32).10 All sorts of differences
of opinion existed between these new movements and the panghulus,
but there was also a common goal: furthering the cause of Islam vis-à-
vis the colonial government (Hisyam 2001).
10.2 The period from 1920 until 1965
The rise of nationalism, independence, and Sukarno’s rule
In 1922, the colonial government established a commission for the re-
organisation of the Religious Council. In addition to Muslim leaders
and Javanese local rulers (bupati or regent), this commission included
Hussein Djajadiningrat, the government’s Deputy-Advisor for Native
Affairs, and the professor of adat law Ter Haar (Lev 1972: 18). The work
of this commission eventually contributed to the drafting and enact-
ment of a regulation that came into force in 1937. This regulation chan-
ged the status, name, and composition of the councils on Java and
Madura. It established ‘Panghulu courts’, to be comprised of a religious
scholar (panghulu) serving in the capacity of judge, who could be
assisted by two assessors and a clerk. These would all be salaried
positions in an effort to professionalise the courts. In addition, an
Islamic Court of Appeals (Mahkamah Islam Tinggi) was established for
the whole of Java and Madura. Under the same regulation, South
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Kalimantan was provided with an equivalent court structure.11 The new
Religious Courts retained their authority to settle marital disputes.
However, adjudication of religious endowments (wakaf)12 and of inheri-
tance law was removed from their jurisdiction. The regulation granted
the secular General Courts (Landraden) full authority in matters relating
to property. Understandably, the 1937 reform was seen as being anti-
Islamic and sparked much resistance from Muslim movements, but to
no avail (Cammack 2007: 148; Lev 1972: 19-24).
The end of colonialism and the birth pangs of independence
In 1942, Japan invaded the Netherlands Indies and took over the ad-
ministration of the archipelago. All existing laws remained in force;
therefore, the position of Islamic law remained largely unchanged. The
Japanese did, however, concentrate the supervision of religious affairs
into a single department of Religious Affairs instead of spread across
various ministries as it had been previously (Lev 1972: 44).
From the end of 1944, when independence was in sight, a secret
council of prominent Indonesians began meeting in order to advise the
Japanese on administrative affairs. The agenda of these discussions in-
cluded the position of Islam (ibid: 34-36). The visions of ‘nationalists’
and ‘Muslim leaders’ soon diverged on this issue, resulting in the coun-
cil becoming deeply divided regarding the question of whether a future
independent state of Indonesia should still have Religious Courts. A
number of Muslim leaders hoped for an ‘Islamic state’ that would en-
force the sharia for all Muslims. During negotiations in June 1945, their
wishes were initially honoured in the so-called Jakarta Charter, which
was intended as the preamble to the new constitution. This document
stipulated that the new state would be based on the belief in God ‘with
the obligation to implement sharia for the adherents of Islam’ (Cribb &
Brown 1997: 15).
But in the following weeks, nationalist leaders Sukarno and Hatta
changed their minds. When they pronounced Indonesia’s indepen-
dence on 17 August 1945 and read out and disseminated the first consti-
tution, the cited words (‘with the obligation to…’) appeared to have been
deleted. Sukarno and Hatta preferred a national state under a strong,
unified leadership and with a secular, modernising orientation.
The ideological foundations of the Indonesian Constitution of 1945
lay in the five principles of the Pancasila. The Pancasila, which literally
means ‘five pillars’, became part of the constitutional preamble. As
such, it formed part of the highest source of law in the Indonesian
state. The five principles were:
– belief in the One and Almighty God;
– just and civilised humanity;
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– national unity;
– popular sovereignty governed by wise policies arrived at through de-
liberation and representation; and
– social justice.
This political formula incorporated the main ideological currents in
Indonesia’s political arena: Islam, internationally recognised principles
of humanity, nationalism, traditional governance, democracy, and social-
ism. The general formulation of the first principle was meant to as-
suage the fears of the followers of other religions. Formally, no space
was left for atheism or polytheism, but, culturally, religion in Indonesia
was syncretic and tolerant.
Islamist rebellions, Islamic politics, administration, and law in the young
republic
After independence, the Religious Courts remained in place, in accor-
dance with the constitution’s transitional provision that all laws and
state institutions would remain unchanged as long as they did not con-
flict with the new constitution. The first twenty years of the young
Indonesian republic, led by Sukarno from 1945 until the beginning of
the New Order in 1965/1966, constituted a period of much military, po-
litical, and ideological tension and conflict. The struggle for indepen-
dence undertaken against the Dutch lasted until December 1949.
During this chaotic period, a number of insurrections against the re-
public occurred in various regions. In 1948, a mystic leader in West
Java proclaimed himself to be the leader of an Islamic state based on
the sharia and ruled by clergymen (Ricklefs 1981: 215-216). This Darul
Islam insurgence sparked years of conflict with the government in the
rural areas of West Java.
Starting in 1950, a rebellion against Jakarta also broke out in South
Sulawesi, which aligned itself politically with Darul Islam. In 1953, Aceh
joined in the insurgency (ibid: 232, 235). In 1956, army officers also re-
belled in Sumatra and in 1957 in Kalimantan, the Moluccas, and North
and South Sulawesi (ibid: 242). After a failed assassination attempt on
Sukarno by Muslim extremists later that year, he began opting for a
more dictatorial form of rule. The army supported him in this, as did
his own nationalist party, ‘Partai Nasional Indonesia’ (PNI), and the
communist party, ‘Partai Komunis Indonesia’ (PKI). Starting in 1957,
he referred to his reign as ‘Guided Democracy’. Relations with Aceh
were restored in 1959 by giving the province a special legal status that
granted it autonomy in matters of education, culture, and religion.13 In
West Java, the Darul Islam rebels were pushed back, but were not to
fully give up their fight until 1965 (Van Dijk 1988: 40).
SHARIA AND NATIONAL LAW IN INDONESIA 443
After independence, the Islamic mass organisation Masyumi, which
had been founded during the Japanese occupation, had become the big-
gest political party. Initially, the NU, the Muhammadiyah, and other
Muslim organisations worked together under the banner of Masyumi.
Several prime ministers belonged to this coalition (Ricklefs 1981: 230).
Following an internal conflict, however, between the ‘pliable’ conserva-
tives and the ‘strict’ modernists, the conservative NU left the Masyumi
during the 1950s and started working together with the nationalists and
communists.
In 1955, general elections were held for parliament and for the
Konstituante, the Constitutional Assembly of Indonesia. Masyumi, PNI,
NU, and PKI became the biggest parties. In the Konstituante, which was
inaugurated in 1956, Muslim politicians argued that the Jakarta Charter
should be incorporated into the constitution, but this proposal was re-
jected by a small majority (ibid: 253). Sukarno, who adamantly contin-
ued his push for national unity, now tried to sway popular opinion in
favour of the ‘Nasakom’ ideology, trying to unify three competing ideol-
ogies (Nasionalisme, Agama (religion), and Komunisme (ibid: 256). At
this juncture, the communists were becoming more and more power-
ful, as the Muslim parties steadily lost ground.
On the administrative front, successive cabinets attempted to orga-
nise and regulate government and society following independence in
1945. A year later, in 1946, the Ministry of Religion was established
(Lev 1972: 43). This new ministry opened local bureaus for religious af-
fairs throughout the country, the so-called KUA (Kantor Urusan Agama).
Oversight of the Religious Courts was also transferred in 1946 from
the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Religion (ibid: 64). The minis-
try offered ample employment opportunities for supporters of the NU,
and of the Masyumi, who, unlike other civil servants, mostly had their
origins from pious, non-aristocratic circles (ibid: 53). Enactment of Law
22/1946 brought the contracting and registration of Muslim marriages
and divorces within the administrative jurisdiction of the ministry (ibid:
54-57). The office of the salaried Civil Registrar, whose functioning fol-
lowed national, uniform procedures overseen by the local bureaus for
religious affairs, was also created. While the Ministry of Religion was
viewed with hope by Muslim activists, it was seen with fear by others.
Would it propagate Islam and undermine the state or would it control
Islam on behalf of the state?
After the declaration of independence, nationalists made several at-
tempts at abolishing the Religious Courts. The first was Act 19/1948,
stipulating that the courts must be integrated into secular state courts.
However, due to the ongoing struggle for independence against the
Dutch, this law was not implemented and the Religious Courts simply
continued to function as they always had, just now formally supported
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by the Ministry of Religion. Finally, in 1957, the cabinet enacted
Government Regulation 45, authorising the formation of Islamic courts
in every district in the outer islands where they did not already exist
(Cammack 2007: 149). While the jurisdiction of these Religious Courts
outside of Java appeared to be broader, as it included inheritance mat-
ters (ibid), in fact, it was more limited because its scope was decreed to
be for ‘the application of the laws living in society’. In essence,
Regulation 45/1957 was a continuation of adat law policies, but now for
the purpose of formation of a ‘national adat’ (Bowen 2003: 53).
The Supreme Court in Jakarta, led by the progressive Wirjono, was of
the opinion that the position of widows under traditional adat law and
Islamic law was too weak. Lev notes the court’s argumentation, includ-
ing reference to ‘the equal participation of women in the national strug-
gles’ and ‘the strong relationship between husband and wife’ (1962:
213-222). In 1960, the Supreme Court ruled that ‘adat inheritance law
throughout Indonesia concerning the widow can be so formulated that
a widow is always an heir to the separately owned property […] of her
husband.’ Lev further notes, ‘[t]he essential point of this decision […] is
that the Supreme Court’s view of justice has prevailed over the several
adat views of justice […]’ (ibid: 222). This new nationalist legal discourse
with regard to the position of sharia vis-à-vis adat law in Indonesia’s na-
tional legal system came to expression in the plea of the eminent
Muslim jurist Hazairin for the creation of a fifth Sunni school of
Islamic jurisprudence, the Madhhab Indonesia. This would be based on
an eclectic amalgamation of elements taken from the teachings of the
four existing schools of jurisprudence complemented with Indonesian
local adat practices, e.g. joint marital property (harta bersama).
10.3 The period from 1965 until 1985
The heyday of Suharto’s New Order
On 30 September 1965 the army allegedly foiled an attempted leftist
coup. This sparked off an immense power struggle, which eventually
devolved into a huge massacre in which the army – backed by Muslim
groups – imprisoned and murdered hundreds of thousands of commu-
nists and communist sympathisers. Sukarno lost his authority and on
11 March 1966 he signed a document in which he transferred executive
powers to Suharto, who, in turn, ordered the Communist Party to be
abolished. The following year, Sukarno was officially deposed and
Suharto proclaimed himself president of the republic (Cribb & Brown
1997: 110-111). His rule, generally referred to as the ‘New Order’ (Orde
Baru), was to last for 32 years.
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Political control, bureaucratisation and two major laws
Under Suharto’s rule only three political parties were allowed, all of
which were controlled by the government. Golkar, a secular mass orga-
nisation initiated by the army in 1964 to unite all forces against the
communist party, became the dominant ruling party. All civil servants
were pressured to become members of Golkar. Existing Islamic parties
were ordered to merge, thus becoming the United Development Party,
or PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan). The PPP together with the na-
tionalist Democratic Party of Indonesia, or PDI (Partai Demokrasi
Indonesia – the third and final political party permitted to operate un-
der Suharto’s regime – engaged in a very restrained form of opposition
politics. With the help of his generals, Suharto created a stable, but re-
pressive police state that aimed for quick economic growth. Indonesia’s
natural resources – oil, gas, and wood – were exploited at rapid rates.
Suharto also set about to improve relations with the West and the inter-
national community.14
Suharto’s politics of stability, control, bureaucratisation, and forced
‘Pancasila-harmony’ also affected Islam in Indonesia, which was initi-
ally allocated a secure, but limited role. The Ministry of Religion exer-
cised political and administrative oversight of Islamic organisations,
Islamic education, and the administration of Islamic justice. In the
1970s, the government made two major new laws to further define the
position of the sharia, namely the Basic Act 14/1970 on the Judiciary
and the Marriage Act 1/1974.
The Judiciary Act of 1970 specified that the national judiciary would
be comprised of four sectors: general, administrative, military, and reli-
gious. In this context the word ‘religious’ (agama) in effect only referred
to Islam.15 Courts in all four sectors would be state courts, with both
courts of first instance and appellate courts. The new law signalled the
unification, strengthening and expansion of the state-led Islamic judi-
cial sector (previously regulated in 1882, 1937, and 1957). The Religious
Courts still required, however, approval from the General Courts for ex-
ecution of their judicial decisions. Moreover, the new law of 1970 set
forth that judgments of the Religious Courts were subject to review by
the Supreme Court. Thus, the expansion notwithstanding, the subjuga-
tion of Islamic law was once again formally established. Initially, the
Ministry of Religion resisted the Supreme Court’s newfound authority
over the Islamic courts and tried to keep the courts ‘insulated from the
pressures to conform to the imperatives of a national legal system’
(Cammack 2007: 156). But, in 1979 when the Supreme Court actually
exercised its jurisdiction over two cases originating in the Religious
Courts, this was by and large accepted by the Ministry.
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Before the 1974 Marriage Act was promulgated, various drafts had
been discussed, none of which were ever approved. In particular,
Islamic modernists and orthodox groups disagreed about draft provi-
sions on polygamy and divorce. The orthodox preferred to leave every-
thing to the uncodified sharia, but in 1973 modernists succeeded in
pressuring the government to propose a bill that would strengthen the
position of women in many respects and expand state supervision.
Orthodox groups rose up in sharp opposition to these proposals, and
massive, heated demonstrations were held around the parliamentary
premises. After physical and political intervention of the army, the par-
liament reached a compromise, replacing a number of the proposals by
less far-reaching reforms (Butt 1999: 122-123). Some of the new provi-
sions about divorce were, however, so ambiguously worded that after an
initial reading, one was still left unsure as to whether they entailed a
modernist or a conservative solution. In any case, the government was
now able to proudly declare that a unified marriage law covered all of
Indonesia, and that the colonial Mixed Marriage Ordinance of 1898 had
been abolished.
Generally speaking, the Religious Courts put themselves to their
tasks of reviewing applications for divorce and polygamy. While cases of
polygamy were rather exceptional, unilateral repudiation was common,
although the statistics fluctuated significantly per region (Otto & Pompe
1988). However, because the new act was still weak in defining norms
in several areas (e.g. the validity of unregistered marriages, grounds for
polygamy and divorce, and guidelines on interreligious marriages) it
did not end legal uncertainty.16
In the meantime, the government actively prosecuted groups of
Muslim radicals that remained active after the disbandment of the Darul
Islam. Ba’asyir, who would later gain notoriety as the alleged mentor of
the perpetrators of the Bali bombings in 2002, was arrested in 1970 for
his activities in the underground Komando Jihad. The prime objective of
this organisation was the creation of an Islamic state. It was notorious
for its bombing attacks on cinemas, nightclubs, and churches, in resis-
tance to the regime of Suharto.
The Council of Indonesian Religious Scholars (MUI)
During the 1970s there was little trust between the government and the
conservative religious leaders. In reaction to this, in 1975, Suharto, in
his usual, crafty manner, attended to the creation of a national Council
of Indonesian Religious Scholars, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI).
First, twenty-six provincial councils were formed, which, in turn, insti-
tuted a national council. The status of the MUI was unclear: was it a
private or a semi-state institution? One of the responsibilities of the
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MUI was to assess the religious quality of laws (Bowen 2003: 229-231).
The council also proclaimed unsolicited legal opinions (fatwas) that
could be very controversial at times. In 1980, for example, the MUI de-
clared itself against all marriages between Muslims and Christians,
and, in 1981, it declared the attendance of Muslims at Christian celebra-
tions to be sinful (ibid: 235). In the 1980s, the MUI was involved in the
establishment of an Islamic banking sector. Some of its members also
participated in drafting the ‘Compilation of Islamic Law’, an attempt to
have religious scholars and jurists decide on a restatement of the sharia
in force in Indonesia (see section below).
Through these measures Suharto provided a place for Islam during
the New Order. The focus lay on control; what could be seen as islami-
sation of national law often came down to nationalisation of Islamic
law. Because of the infamous Ormas legislation (1985), Islamic organisa-
tions, like others, were legally obliged to recognise the Pancasila state
ideology as their highest norm and sole foundation. Any source of ser-
ious opposition against Suharto’s rule, Islamic or otherwise, was
harshly suppressed.
10.4 The period from 1985 until the present
The late New Order, the Reformasi, and recent developments
Suharto’s pro-Islam policies and mounting criticism
Once major Muslim leaders had openly accepted the supremacy of the
Pancasila, the proverbial hatchet between state and Islam could officially
be buried. Rather than promoting political Islam, these leaders now
turned their attention to ‘cultural Islam’ (Salim & Azra 2003b: 10).
This, in turn, stimulated Suharto to embrace a pro-Islam policy.
Incidentally, this came at a politically opportune moment, as Suharto
had faced mounting criticism since the 1980s, and was, therefore, in
crucial need of support from Muslim movements, notably in the elec-
tions of 1992 and 1993 (Hefner 2003: 155).
Criticism of Suharto’s regime came from various corners. For years,
the continuing violation of human rights by his regime had been openly
condemned from abroad. In Indonesia, most people and organisations
were more hesitant at voicing such criticism, partially out of fear, and
partially because the achievements of Suharto for the country’s stability
and economy were still appreciated. When, however, the corruption of
Suharto’s family and inner circle rose to unprecedented heights, the
support his regime enjoyed on the street level started to evaporate.
In the 1990s the regime’s pro-Islam politics led Suharto’s protégé
Habibie, the Minister of Technology and Research, to form ICMI, a
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national association of Muslim intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan
Muslim Indonesia). The ICMI brought together pious Muslim intellec-
tuals, giving them a useful political instrument (Schwarz 1999: 179).
The association had its own think tank and a newspaper to better disse-
minate its ideas. The goals of ICMI were the improvement of the eco-
nomic position of Muslims and the incorporation of Islamic values into
official government policy (ibid: 175-176).
During the 1990s Islam also manifested itself increasingly in other
areas. Islamic schools educated a new generation of students, trying to
instil in them devotion, discipline, diligence, and moral ideals, all in the
name of Islam. Within the bureaucracy Muslim civil servants were now
permitted to openly present themselves as devout Muslims. Meetings
were opened with an Islamic prayer, and speeches were preceded by
Arabic prayer blessings. Suharto also became aware of this change of
winds and he himself made the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1991. Both he
and Habibie, who became vice president, increasingly emphasised the
Islamic character of the New Order. Nonetheless, the Pancasila state
ideology remained the fundamental guideline for Indonesia’s govern-
ance, including in matters pertaining to religion. National religious har-
mony continued to be imposed and enforced from above, a kind of ‘to-
talitarian tolerance’ so to speak.
Meanwhile, in 1989 a new legislative centrepiece, Act 7/1989 on
Religious Courts had been enacted. This law further regulated the posi-
tion and functioning of the Religious Courts. Earlier drafts had sparked
heated debates (Bowen 2003: 185-189). Many nationalists, members of
the Christian minority, and professional jurists were strongly opposed
to the law because they viewed it as an implicit acknowledgment and ac-
ceptance of an autonomous sharia sector within the national legal sys-
tem. In contrast, the government and the army rather saw the law as a
means through which to increase the state’s influence over Islam.
For the content of the applicable law, the Religious Courts had to rely
on the aforementioned Compilation of Islamic Law, which had already
been completed in 1988, at a time when the debates about the
Religious Courts’ bill were still raging. The Compilation was drafted by
many commissions made up of religious scholars, jurists, and other ex-
perts. In this way, the Indonesian government had ensured national
unification and codification of major parts of the Islamic jurisprudence
(fiqh), with the endorsement of both leading religious scholars and pro-
minent judges. In 1991, Suharto issued a presidential instruction order-
ing his Minister of Religion to disseminate the Compilation to be used
by state institutions ‘[…] as a reference to the greatest possible extent in
resolving the issues it covers […]’ (Nurlaelawati 2010: 89). The minister
then instructed all relevant state agencies to ‘apply as much as possible
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the mentioned Compilation to complement the other legal regulations’.
Nowadays the Compilation’s rules are taught in schools and applied in
Religious Courts. However, from studies of court decisions and inter-
views with judges, it appears that some judges still use fiqh-sources be-
yond the Compilation, as they want to be able to choose from a broad
range of sources in order to arrive at just decisions that are also consid-
ered socially and religiously acceptable (ibid).
The Islamic revival taking hold in society in the late 1980s and 1990s
also increased the demand for Islamic banking. Thus, in 1991, Suharto,
who had hitherto been fearful of Muslim groups attaining financial
power, agreed to the establishment of an Islamic bank. The founding of
Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI) was intended both to strengthen the
economic position of non-Chinese Indonesians as well as to serve as an
example of corporate governance and honest banking.17
The fall of Suharto, winds of constitutional change, and the Islamic axis
When in 1997 the Asian Financial Crisis struck Indonesia, resistance
against Suharto became massive and unstoppable. Students played a key
role in these protests, demanding large-scale political reforms under the
banner of Reformasi. Leading the resistance against Suharto were,
among others, the NU leader and religious scholar Abdurrahman
Wahid, a democratic-minded nationalist, and the more radical academic
Amien Rais, leader of the Muhammadiyah movement. They dared to
voice harsh criticism of the old president.18 After large and protracted
demonstrations, Suharto resigned in 1998. The Reformasi could then
begin: democratisation, social justice, liberalisation, decentralisation,
and possibly a chance for Islamic activists to wrest themselves free from
the legacy of colonial and postcolonial state control.
Suharto was succeeded by Habibie, who swiftly pronounced a num-
ber of laws that regulated the upcoming processes of democratisation
and islamisation. Law 22/1999 on regional autonomy, for instance,
brought about a major political transformation of central-local relations.
In addition, Habibie promulgated legislation concerning organisation of
the pilgrimage (hajj), management of required almsgiving (zakat), and
Islamic banking (Salim 2003: 228). It must be noted that these laws did
not oblige Indonesians to undertake the hajj, pay zakat taxes, or open
an Islamic bank account. They were procedural laws establishing an of-
ficial legal framework for those Muslims who wanted to adhere to their
religious duties in these fields (ibid: 229).
Habibie called parliamentary elections in the summer of 1999.
Abdurrahman Wahid’s PKB and Rais’s PAN emerged as new Islamic
parties. Together with the traditionally law-abiding PPP and a number
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of smaller Islamic parties, they formed the so-called ‘Islamic axis’ in
Indonesia’s newly elected parliament. Of the axis parties only the PPP
and one of the smaller parties strove for the revival of the Jakarta
Charter and the islamisation of the constitution. The big winner of the
1999 elections was, however, a secular party: the Partai Demokrasi
Indonesia (PDI-P) led by Sukarno’s daughter Megawati. Nonetheless,
not she, but PKB leader Wahid became president as a result of the poli-
tical manoeuvring of the Islamic axis led by Amien Rais. Megawati was
chosen as vice president; Rais became speaker of the parliament.
President Wahid further restricted the role of the army in politics
and initiated several major constitutional changes, strengthening hu-
man rights and the free press, empowering elected representative
bodies, and safeguarding the independence of the judiciary. He also
strongly opposed an Islamic state and the introduction of sharia, as he
was of the opinion that religion and politics must remain separated
(Bowen 2003: 240). Attempts to further islamise politics and laws did
not, therefore, stand much of a chance under Wahid, despite his
Islamic background and support base as the NU leader. A majority in
parliament shared his viewpoints on these issues.19 In 2000, several
Islamic parties supported a bill on interreligious harmony. This draft
proposed to outlaw mixed marriages and to set stricter conditions on
the building of new churches in terms of a minimum number of adher-
ents and the permission of inhabitants in the neighbourhood. In re-
sponse to such developments, and especially when their churches were
occasionally set on fire, Christians rose in protest (ibid: 239, 247). In
the end, the bill was rejected.
Wahid felt so confident that he occasionally took stands diametrically
opposed to those held by prominent ulama and the MUI. In the high-
profile Ajinomoto case in 2002 the MUI had ordered tests of flavouring
agents produced by the Ajinomoto company, and it was concluded that
one product contained substances from the pancreas gland of pigs and
was therefore considered forbidden (haram). President Wahid, drawing
on other lab test results, decided that the substance was permissible
(halal), and went on to declare that both the MUI and he were correct,
and that the matter was a case of free interpretation (ijtihad). To the
public it was no longer clear who held ultimate authority on religious
matters in the country and who could make binding decisions in cases
such as these (ibid: 233-234).
Decentralisation and local sharia-based regulations
Wahid had carried through with the decentralisation process started by
Habibie in 1999, which strongly expanded the autonomy of the dis-
tricts. For two provinces, Papua and Aceh, special autonomy laws were
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enacted that granted the provinces more authority in making their own
provincial regulations. In Papua, these regulations referred to adat laws,
while in Aceh, according to Act 18/2001 on Aceh, priority was paid to
the sharia.
Act 18/2001 would form the legal basis for the provincial government
of Aceh to issue a number of regional regulations called ‘qanun’ (Arabic
for law) on several contested issues. The central motive of the national
government concerning Aceh is revealed by Ichwan (2007: 194-196)
who demonstrates that both Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati as pre-
sidents had instructed their minister of Religion ‘to promote the initia-
tive for creating security through a religious approach’. This played into
the hands of the provincial branch of the MUI in Aceh, re-established
in 2001 as MPU (ibid: 204), which had already played an active islamis-
ing role by issuing several fatwas. In particular, its fatwa ordering wo-
men to wear veils resulted in much uneasiness. But the government
did not immediately take a stand on this thorny issue. As Bowen (2003:
231-233) noted, however, it became difficult to ignore the fatwa, particu-
larly since in 2002 and 2003 the province’s Sharia Office and the pro-
vincial parliament laid down Aceh’s new sharia policy in a number of
qanuns (Ichwan 2007: 205) (see 10.5).
Elsewhere in Indonesia, several districts enacted sharia-based regula-
tions (Perda Syariah). Yet, in most areas, as a result of the 1999 decen-
tralisation, it was not so much Islam that was undergoing a revival, but
rather adat. Locally, rules of adat law dealt with issues of political
authority and of land and natural resources. In the strongly Islamic pro-
vince of Minangkabau, for example, the return of the adat was of a
stronger political consequence than the return to Islamic beliefs. In
other areas of the archipelago, the resurgence of traditional loyalties led
to conflict. Consequently, ethnic and sectarian violence broke out in
places such as Central Sulawesi and the Moluccas, where bloody fights
between Muslims and Christians ensued.
Dynamics of Islam and politics from Abdurrahman Wahid to Megawati
Meanwhile, Wahid had come into conflict with parliament because of
his increasing capriciousness and his rude and disdainful behaviour to-
wards political opponents. Following accusations of mismanagement
and involvement in corruption scandals, parliament pressured him into
resignation for his ‘grave’ failure to abide to the ‘main guidelines of
state policy’. Megawati succeeded him as president in July 2001, with
the leader of the Islamic PPP, Hamzah Haz, becoming her vice
president.
Following the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the ensuing
American attack on Afghanistan, the Indonesian government strongly
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endeavoured to prevent these foreign geopolitical developments from
having negative repercussions on interreligious harmony at home. In
October 2002, Indonesia itself was hit by a major terrorist attack target-
ing a nightclub on Bali, as a result of which many Australians and
Indonesians died. In 2003, an attack on the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta
followed, and the year after the Australian Embassy became the target
of Islamic terrorism. Subsequent investigations focussed on local
groups, national organisations, and branches of international Muslim
terrorist networks.20 A number of individuals were condemned to
death, but the involvement of Ba’asyir, the alleged leader of the Jamaah
Islamiyah, could not be irrefutably established.
During Megawati’s presidency, which strongly relied upon a number
of ‘superministers’, able technocrats, and military figures, including
president-to-be Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, various developments sur-
faced signalling the continuing islamisation of society. With the ap-
pointment of a vice president like Hamzah Haz, for example, who him-
self had three wives, the official state policy of rejecting polygamy,
which had been adhered to for years, became a dead letter. Polygamy
now occurred openly and trouble-free. In order to circumvent the re-
strictive provisions of the Marriage Act of 1974, men chose to have their
polygamous marriages contracted solely by an imam. Earlier studies re-
vealed that of all divorces about half took place without the involvement
of the Religious Courts or prescribed law (Cammack et al. 2007: 120;
Debating 2003; see also 10.6).21 Thus, under Megawati, the govern-
ment’s control and supervision of religion seemed to lose some of its
strength.
In addition, a fierce argument arose on the new draft criminal code
when word spread that a new definition of adultery (i.e. all extramarital
sexual relations) was adopted directly from fiqh sources. Minister of
Justice, Yusril Mahendra of the small Islamist party PBB, was suppo-
sedly employing this tactic in order to win the support of the Muslim
voters. However, it was the new fundamentalist Muslim party PKS,
which was established in 1998, that grew very swiftly thanks to a young,
well-educated and highly disciplined cadre of volunteers, engaging in
social work in villages and urban kampongs. The party, based on the
ideology of Hassan al-Banna (founder of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood), tried to come to power by using democratic ways, and
would do quite well in several elections. Meanwhile, the practice of
Islamic banking also expanded. The MUI successfully campaigned for
further formalisation and regulation of interest-free banking (Bank
Indonesia 2002).
Despite these developments, no clear-cut, massive process of political
and legal islamisation took place. So far, islamisation appeared indeed
to be more cultural than politico-legal in nature. In fact, from 2001 to
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2004, a working group under the authority of the Minister of Religion
drafted a new marriage act trying to improve the status of women. This
so-called Counter Legal Draft aroused so much protest from orthodox
Muslim organisations upon its publication, that it had to be withdrawn
by the end of 2004 (Mulia 2007: 128-145). However, Islamist senti-
ments did not altogether get the upper hand among the population as a
whole. Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, an overwhelming majority of
Indonesian Muslims has come out in favour of secular and nationalist
parties; this was confirmed in the 2004 parliamentary and presidential
elections. The two parties that won the parliamentary election in April
2004 – Golkar (21%) and PDI-P (19%) – were both secular in orienta-
tion, as was the third party, Wahid’s PKB (12%), which is allied to the
traditionalist NU. In October, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) be-
came Indonesia’s first directly elected president. SBY is a nationalist
with a military background and an experienced cabinet minister. He
leads a small secular party, the Partai Demokrat. Yusuf Kalla, a Golkar
politician and entrepreneur from NU circles, became his vice president.
The presidency of SBY (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono)
Since the 2004 elections several legal changes have affected the existing,
balanced relationship between sharia and national law. These reforms
went in different directions. In 2004 the 1970 Act on the Judiciary was
replaced by Act 4/2004, which transferred supervision of Religious
Courts fully to the Supreme Court, thereby reducing the supervisory
role of the Ministry of Religion to an advisory one. In 2006, Act 3/2006
on Religious Courts, amending the 1989 Act, strengthened the court’s
jurisdiction in inheritance cases between Muslims, and expanded juris-
diction over cases in sharia economy (Ekonomi Syaria).
In order to establish guidelines for the resolution of economic dis-
putes in the Religious Courts, the Supreme Court issued in 2008 the
Compilation of Economic Sharia Law (Kompilasi Hukum Ekonomi
Syari’ah, usually abbreviated as KHES). In the same year, the
Indonesian parliament promulgated Law 21/2008 on Islamic Banking.
Together with Law 41/2004 on Religious Foundations (wakaf) and Law
38/1999 on Almsgiving (zakat) the KHES and the banking law have
now met the demand for an economic system based on principles of
Islamic justice (see 10.8). The Ekonomi Syaria regulations, however, are
all of a voluntary, optional nature.
In this process of islamisation, state institutions with a predomi-
nantly nationalist and secular outlook, such as the Bank Indonesia and
the Supreme Court, kept the say over legal developments. In the same
vein, in the area of marriage law, the secular General Courts were given
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a role in registering interreligious marriages by Act 23/2006 on Civil
Registration.
Act 11/2006 on special autonomy of Aceh replaced the 2001 Act on
the subject. It further regulated the competence of Aceh’s provincial
government to issue qanuns as well as the jurisdiction of the special
Islamic courts in the region (the Mahkamah Syari’ah). These powers
went clearly beyond the 2001 Act. 22 The 2006 law confirmed and for-
malised regulatory practices that had emerged since 2002 in Aceh, no-
tably the qanuns criminalising gambling and drinking and prescribing
the corporal punishment of caning. It has broadened the jurisdiction of
the Mahkamah Syari’ah by adding elements of criminal law (jinayah)
and commercial law (muamalat) to it, as already was indicated in
Qanun 10/2002. A legal debate has arisen about whether the qanun
provisions on criminal matters now overrule the applicability of national
criminal law, as laid down in the criminal code. The government and
the Supreme Court have the power to annul Aceh’s individual qanuns
for ‘going against the public interest or violating higher legislation, un-
less the law regulates otherwise [italics added]’. This may have occurred as
the expansion of jurisdiction has been approved in a general way by na-
tional law. So far the qanuns have been limited to minor crimes.
Human rights defenders have put forward that Aceh’s qanuns and other
sharia-based district regulations have encroached on human rights stan-
dards. This could subject such sharia-based regional regulations to re-
view by the Constitutional Court.
What do these developments in Aceh mean for the existing relation-
ship between sharia and national law? Lindsey & Hooker (2007: 252)
consider Aceh’s qanuns as potentially radical, but state that their imple-
mentation is considered by most Acehnese as symbolic rather than
hard-line Islamist. They do note, however, that since the tsunami of
December 2004, the qanuns have become more than just aspirational
and that the new courts are more willing to exercise their expanded jur-
isdiction. Indeed, the first and widely publicised caning of gamblers in
Bireuen in June 2005 has been repeated several times in other district
towns.
In 2008, freedom of religion came under attack from Islamist organisa-
tions who were putting pressure on the government to pronounce a le-
gal ban on the Ahmadiyya. The issue has been politicised since a 2005
MUI fatwa asking for a ban of this religious group, which considers it-
self Islamic, but which is not recognised by Sunni orthodoxy. Mosques
and members of the group have been attacked by mobs on Lombok and
elsewhere. While one government body advocated a legal ban, the presi-
dent’s legal advisors cautioned against it. In June 2008, a joint decree
was issued by the ministers of justice and religion warning, on the one
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hand, Ahmadiyya adherents to return to true Islam or leave it, while
warning radicals, on the other hand, not to attack the Ahmadiyya, or
they would be sanctioned. Legally speaking, though, this decree did not
have the effect of a ban.
This illustrates the way issues of sharia and law are played out in pre-
sent-day Indonesia. Time and again they are politicised by Islamist
groups. Actually, since 1998 the MUI has shifted from a pro-govern-
ment role to a rather oppositional, Islamist stance. Meanwhile, the state,
while deliberately giving in to some demands, has consistently tried to
maintain a balance as well as overall control.
A notable instrument of this balancing effort are the Religious
Courts that have become a recognised and established part of the na-
tional judiciary under supervision of the Supreme Court. Cammack
(2007: 169) has compared the role of Religious Courts in the 1970s,
when they were ‘essentially informal and non-professional’ to their pre-
sent role. He writes:
Despite their shortcomings […] the unrestructured Islamic
courts were generally successful in addressing the needs of
those who used them. […] It is my sense that the professionaliza-
tion and bureaucratization of the Islamic judiciary has not fun-
damentally altered the essential institutional culture of the
courts.
Cammack calls the Religious Courts ‘a relative success story in
Indonesia’s otherwise dysfunctional legal system’ (ibid). A 2008 study
carried out by the Supreme Court and AUSAID revealed a high satisfac-
tion rate among the courts’ users – over 70 per cent of all clients and
80 per cent of the total applicants. It appears, however, that the poor
still face serious barriers in accessing the Religious Courts (Sumner
2008: 4). Indeed, it is a sobering thought that whatever law-makers or
judges may decide on the position of sharia in the national legal sys-
tem, it does not affect a considerable part of the population since they
are simply unable to afford a life within the limits of the law.
10.5 Constitutional law23
The words ‘Islam’, ‘Islamic law’, and ‘sharia’ do not feature in the con-
stitution. Thus, Indonesia is not an ‘Islamic state’, and Islam is not the
official state religion. Therefore, unlike in other Muslim countries, the
supremacy of the national constitution over competing normative sys-
tems should be beyond any legal doubt. Yet, despite this presumptive
clarity, one cannot consider Indonesia a fully secular state. The
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preamble of the constitution refers to the Pancasila state ideology as the
highest source of law, within which the first ‘pillar’ or principle is iden-
tified as ‘the belief in the One and Almighty God’. Further to this, athe-
ism is not recognised, and in order to marry, one must declare his or
her religion. The Ministry of Religion has also been specifically tasked
with translation of the first pillar into state policy and practice.
The Indonesian legislator has largely defined the relationship be-
tween national law and sharia in the 1989 Act on Religious Courts24 in
procedural terms, and in substantive terms in the Marriage Act 1/1974
and in the 1991 ‘Compilation of Islamic Law’. The legislator has further
created space for districts and provinces to experiment with sharia-re-
lated regional regulations through use of the Act on Regional
Autonomy (Act 22/1999, amended and replaced by Act 32/2004).
Exceptionally, in Act 11/2006 on Special Autonomy for Aceh, Jakarta
has empowered this autonomous region to enact regulations (qanuns)
that go so far as to include certain sharia-based criminal regulations
and punishments such as caning. In 2009 the outgoing provincial par-
liament of Aceh even approved a new qanun prescribing stoning as a
punishment for adultery; the legal status of this regulation, however, re-
mains highly contested. Beside these elements of potential ‘sharia-isa-
tion’ of the law, it should also be noted here that during the post-1998
constitutional reform process human rights were given a prominent po-
sition in Indonesia’s constitutional law.
This section will address in particular five key aspects of how sharia-
based law has been given legal and institutional spaces in Indonesia’s
constitutional system, namely the Religious Courts, the Ministry of
Religion, the Compilation of Islamic Law, human rights, and
decentralisation.
Religious Courts
The Act on Religious Courts (1989) provides a uniform regulation of
the position, support for, and competence of the Religious Courts
(Cammack 2003: 96). There are three distinct levels of adjudication. In
the first instance, each district has its own Religious Court, whose juris-
diction covers marital relations and inheritance issues of Muslims as
well as the affairs of religious endowments (wakaf). On the provincial
level, there are Religious Appellate Courts; at the apex is the Supreme
Court in Jakarta. The 1989 law not only provides the Religious Courts
with jurisdiction in matters of inheritance law, but also grants them the
authority to execute their own rulings.
A gradual transfer of administrative supervision over the Religious
Courts from the ministry to the ‘one roof’ jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court has been initiated by Act 35/1999, and was finally effectuated in
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2004.25 Based on Law 4/2004 on the Judiciary, the Supreme Court
now oversees the sector of religious jurisdiction as it has done for dec-
ades with its other, secular sectors of general (civil and criminal), ad-
ministrative, and military jurisdiction. Presidential Instruction 21/2004
provides for the effectuation of this new policy for the Religious Courts.
While a Religious Court is essentially a state court, traditionally its
judges have been trained as religious scholars (ulama). Most judges
who presently work at these courts have a degree in sharia studies from
the IAIN.26 The law states that the judges of these courts must have
earned a degree in law or in Islamic law from an institution of higher
education. While most law degrees are obtained from secular faculties
of law, a degree in Islamic law is provided by the sharia faculties of
Islamic universities. Azra notes that the 2003 Advocates Act has also
opened up the lawyer’s profession to graduates of Islamic studies.
Interestingly, the Faculty of Syariah at Jakarta’s National Islamic
University (UIN) has been renamed ‘Faculty of Syariah and National
Law’. Its former rector writes: ‘Within this framework, Islamic law can
be studied simultaneously with national law in ways that can serve to fa-
cilitate further development toward the development of a distinctly
“Indonesian school of Islamic law”’(Azra 2007: 270).
In 2006, the 1989 Act on Religious Courts was amended to expand
the courts’ jurisdiction. Act 3/2006 provides that Religious Courts are
currently the only competent court in inheritance cases between
Muslims. The Act further grants the courts jurisdiction in matters of
Islamic finance in the framework of ‘Ekonomi syariah’. The Act also ac-
knowledges the special jurisdiction of Religious Courts in autonomous
regions, notably the Mahkamah Syariyah in Aceh, inaugurated in 2003
(Ichwan 2007: 193).
The Ministry of Religion
The Ministry of Religion provides supervision over Indonesia’s vary-
ing religions, namely Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism,
Buddhism, and, since 2006, Confucianism. As such, the ministry regu-
lates Islamic education and the mosques, as well as the holy pilgrimage
(hajj). The Ministry has offices in all provinces, districts, and towns,
known as the Bureau of Religious Affairs (KUA, Kantor Urusan
Agama). The Ministry has a Directorate for Islamic Affairs and the
Development of Sharia. However, its previous tasks in developing the
Religious Courts (Art.s 202-115 of the old Decree 1/2001) were removed
since the abovementioned incorporation of these courts in the national
judicial system in 2004.27
Together with the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court, the
Ministry of Religion also exercises supervision over marriage
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registration. It prints marriage certificates, with a standard taklik talak
clause, which provides women with the option of a divorce by ‘auto-
matic repudiation (talak)’ in the event that they are deserted, neglected,
abused, or not provided with financial support by their husband for a
specified number of months (Cammack et al. 2007: 112). Together with
the Supreme Court, the Ministry has directed the courts to interpret the
marriage act in ways favourable to women (Mulia 2007: 130).
The Compilation of Islamic Law and its legal status
The ‘Compilation of Islamic Law in Indonesia’ (Kompilasi Hukum Islam
di Indonesia) is a legal text intended to bring more legal certainty to the
application of sharia-based law by the Religious Courts. Law 1/1974 on
Marriage already stated in Article 2 that the requirements for marriage
are based on religion (i.e. for Muslims on Islamic marriage law). Since
the content of Islamic law is determined by the consensus of religious
scholars, courts have had to rely on a wide range of fiqh texts.28 This si-
tuation led to legal uncertainty, hence the government’s desire for an
authoritative restatement.
To obtain as much legitimacy as possible, the Compilation was
drafted and discussed both by jurists representing state institutions,
and by religious scholars well-versed in Islamic jurisprudence. The
Compilation is constructed as a legal code with three sections: marriage
law, inheritance law, and religious endowments (wakaf). It is comprised
of 229 articles and an explanatory memorandum. Although it was offi-
cially launched in 1991, first by Presidential Instruction 1/1991 and sub-
sequently through a ministerial decree, the Compilation is not a na-
tional law as such. Rather, it is presented by the government as a
‘guideline’ that the Religious Courts should ‘take into account as much
as possible’. The Compilation is formally presented as the Islamic law
of Indonesia, which has been in effect in the Religious Courts (Ka’bah
2007: 87, 282). Through this construction, the government has been
able to fend off accusations that it decides, by way of national law, about
the interpretation of the sharia.
The Compilation stipulates that the eliciting of religious rules from
the sharia is based on five sources: (a) standard texts from the Shafi’ite
school of jurisprudence; (b) additional texts from other legal schools; (c)
existing case law; (d) scholarly legal opinions (fatwas); and (e) the situa-
tion in other countries (cf. Hooker 2003: 23). While much of the con-
tents reflect the mainstream Islamic thought of Indonesia’s religious
scholars, on a number of points, the Compilation has adopted a remark-
ably progressive stance.29
Since 1991, the verdicts of Religious Courts have increasingly re-
ferred to this Compilation. According to Justice Busthanul Arifin of the
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Supreme Court, chairman of the drafting commission, the Compilation
is an example of ‘positive law’. Others insist that it is an authoritative
restatement of existing legal practices, or of living adat law (Bowen
2003: 189-199). The renowned jurist Attamimi, on the other hand, ar-
gues that the legal design of the Compilation has limited its legal force
(Mawardi 2003: 43-44). And, in fact, although the Compilation is now
widely applied by the Religious Courts, it remains contested. Among its
controversial features is a total prohibition of interreligious marriages.
The Counter Legal Draft (see 10.4) testifies to a broadly perceived need
for change to bring it in accordance with national and international hu-
man rights legislation (Mulia 2007: 133).
Human rights
Soon after the Reformasi of 1998, Act 39/1999 on Human Rights was
enacted in order to clearly incorporate human rights standards and
principles into Indonesia’s domestic law. Subsequently, this was laid
down in the Indonesian constitution. A new chapter now includes prin-
ciples such as equality before the law (Art. 28(D)(1)) and non-discrimi-
nation (Art. 28(I)(2)). However, women’s legal status under the sharia-
based family and inheritance law violates these principles on several
points. In addition, the constitution provides for the freedom of all citi-
zens to have a religion (agama) and to practice it, as well as for the free-
dom of conviction (kepercayaan) (Art. 28(E)(2)). These freedoms are
guaranteed by the state (Art. 29(2)).
The key question as to how the rights of equality and religious free-
dom can be reconciled has been dealt with in a typically Indonesian
style, which, depending on one’s point of view, can be described as ba-
lanced, or ambiguous. In 2007, the Constitutional Court in a ruling30
on the Marriage Law of 1974 (see 10.6) concluded that on the one hand
the law’s articles on polygamy are justified by the freedom of religion
as a fundamental right accorded to every Indonesian citizen, while on
the other hand the law’s limitations to polygamy were not deemed con-
trary to the freedom of religion.
The degree to which freedom of religion applies in Indonesia appears
limited in more than one sense. First, the official state ideology of
Pancasila, which speaks of ‘the belief in the One and Almighty God’, is
fundamentally centred on the notion of theism, leaving no formal ac-
knowledgment of or room for atheism or polytheism. Secondly, there
are certain problems inherent to the state’s official recognition of six re-
ligions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and
Confucianism. Minority groups within Islam, such as the Ahmadiyya,
suffer from legal problems. As mentioned in the discussion above, in
June 2008, a Joint-Decree of the ministers of justice and religion called
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on the Ahmadiyya to stop practicing Islam in ways deviating from
authoritative Sunni beliefs. Furthermore, in a formal legal sense, the six
religions are all equal to one another, but in practice Islam occupies a
much stronger and more prominent position. The corpus of national
law includes several elements in the areas of marriage and criminal law
that conflict with the principle of equality of Muslims and non-
Muslims. Other difficulties are encountered in the area of administra-
tive law. The 2006 Revised Joint Ministerial Decree on the
Construction of Houses of Worship demands that religious groups
wanting to build a house of worship first obtain the signatures of at
least 90 members and 60 persons of other religious groups in the com-
munity stating that they support the establishment, as well as approval
from the local KUA office.
Decentralisation
Beside the incorporation of human rights, yet another post-1998 consti-
tutional reform was to fundamentally change the nature of the
Indonesian state. The far-reaching Act on Regional Autonomy – the
1999 Act amended as Act 32/2004 – has not only granted expanded re-
sponsibilities and powers to districts and provinces, but also democra-
tised their composition and decision-making. Many districts and pro-
vinces have used these new powers to locally introduce sharia-based
regulations (PerDa Syariah). According to Lindsey, around 160 such
PerDa Syariah were enacted in at least 24 of Indonesia’s 33 provinces
(2008: 107-108). Most of them target perceived religious, social, and
moral wrongs, such as prostitution, alcohol and drugs, gambling, and
pornography. Others promote and prescribe Islamic practices, such as
religious rituals, Quranic education, and dress codes. Salim cites the ex-
ample of Martapura on Kalimantan, where a district regulation prohib-
ited publicly eating or drinking during the month of Ramadan (2003:
229). Although legally speaking, legislative power concerning ‘religion’
belongs to the central government and not to the regional government,
these PerDa Syariah have not been formally contested by central
authorities.
Corresponding to the nation-wide democratic decentralisation, Aceh
and Papua have been granted even more autonomy resulting in a spe-
cial legal status (see 10.4). Since 1999, the Indonesian government has
resumed granting Aceh special autonomy in the religious, cultural, and
educational sectors. The successive governments, from Habibie (1999)
to Yudhoyono, have taken legal measures permitting Aceh the authority
to ‘enforce the sharia’.31 While Act 44/1999 on the Special Status of
Aceh had still been vague on this point, Act 18/2001 was already more
specific, both in creating space for Aceh’s own regulations (or qanun)
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and in setting the limits. The Act stated that: a) the province may not
enforce sharia regulations conflicting with national laws (Art. 25); b) the
sharia only applies to Muslims (Art. 25 § 3); and c) rulings from the
sharia courts can be appealed before the Supreme Court in Jakarta,
where they can be reviewed and, if necessary, annulled (Art. 26). On
the basis of the 2001 Act, in 2002 and 2003 Aceh enacted several qa-
nuns (hereinafter ‘Q.’), such as Q. 10/2002 on Sharia courts, Q. 11/
2002 on the Implementation of the Islamic creed, worship and symbo-
lism, Q. 12/2003 on Intoxicants, Q. 13/2003 on Gambling, and Q. 14/
2003 on Improper Relations between the Sexes (Ichwan 2007: 205).32
Act 11/2006 has replaced the Acts of 1999 and 2001 and signifi-
cantly broadened the scope of sharia-based law in Aceh. Article 125
of this Act stipulates that implementation of sharia in Aceh covers
the following areas: religion (ibadah); family law (ahwal alsyakhshiyah);
private law (muamalah); criminal law (jinayah); the judiciary (qadha’);
education (tarbiyah); and the mission, promotion, and safeguarding of
Islam (dakwah, syiar, dan pembelaan Islam). Article 126 provides that
every adherent of Islam is obliged to obey and carry out Islamic sharia.
Everybody who lives or is present in Aceh is obliged to respect the im-
plementation of sharia. According to Article 127, the provincial and local
governments are responsible for the implementation of sharia. Article
128 provides that the Sharia Courts (Mahkama Shar’iyah) in Aceh form
part of the national system of religious jurisdiction and are ‘free from
any external influence’. The jurisdiction, supervision, organisation, and
procedures of these courts are further regulated in Articles 128-137 of
the 2006 Act. In 2009, Aceh’s legislature promulgated a regulation on
Islamic criminal law, the validity of which is highly contested (see 10.7).
Indonesia’s post-1998 constitutional law discontinued the authoritar-
ian centralist system of Suharto’s New Order, which strictly imposed on
society an official, harmonious view of state-religion relations and
stifled public debate in sensitive areas such as the relation between
sharia and national law. The new, democratised constitutional law al-
lows for debate and decision-making in multiple spaces about a broad
range of subjects. Today these spaces range from national parliament to
provincial and district legislatures, including the special case of Aceh;
from the Supreme Court as the apex of the national court system to
Religious Courts and General Courts throughout the country, including
the special courts of Aceh; and the Constitutional Court acts as guar-
dian of a constitution rejuvenated by references to all fundamental hu-
man rights. While the jurisdiction of Religious Courts has broadened,
so has the supervisory role of the Supreme Court. In practice, in
Indonesia, as in most other Muslim countries, the most pervasive influ-
ence of sharia remains in the area of family law.
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10.6 Family and inheritance law
Marriage, divorce, and matrimonial property are regulated by Marriage
Act 1/1974. Its provisions are elaborated upon by two Government
Regulations (GR), namely GR 9/1975, which elaborates the substantive
norms and procedures of the Act, and GR 10/1983 (amended by GR
45/1990), which contains special rules for civil servants. Both marriage
law and inheritance law are addressed by the 1991 Compilation of
Islamic Law (see 10.5). The text of the Compilation’s chapter on mar-
riage law matches the text of the 1974 Marriage Act in all respects, the
only difference being that some Indonesian terms are replaced with
equivalent Arabic words. There is no national legislation on inheritance
law for Muslims. The competent court for disputes between Muslims
concerning both marital and inheritance matters is the Religious Court.
The Act on Religious Courts of 1989, as amended by Act 3/2006, con-
tains procedural rules for marriage and inheritance law. More than 90
per cent of the caseload of the Religious Courts consists of divorce
cases (Cammack et al. 2007: 164).
This section will first address four subjects of the marriage law,
namely religion and validity, interreligious marriage, divorce and repu-
diation, and polygamy. This is followed by a short discussion about in-
heritance law. Finally this section will look into the role of Religious
Courts and trends in case law deriving from these courts.
The 1974 Marriage Act represents a relatively liberal interpretation of
sharia norms. It constrains the right of Muslim husbands to divorce
their wives unilaterally by repudiation (talak). It also grants wives a vari-
ety of instruments through which to obtain divorce and sets clear limits
on polygamy. The Act formulates substantive and procedural conditions
that must be met for both divorce and polygamy. While decisions on
these cases are entrusted to the Religious Courts, the review of their de-
cisions is left to the national Supreme Court. Gradually, the Supreme
Court has addressed many of the questions that Act 1/1974 and its gov-
ernment regulations had actually left unanswered. In doing so, the
Supreme Court has established ‘a regulatory regime which would cer-
tainly have met strong opposition if introduced transparently and di-
rectly in 1974’ (Cammack et al. 2007: 111).
Article 2 and the validity of marriages
The Marriage Act declares in Article 2(1) that a marriage is valid when
the two parties have concluded the marriage in accordance with their
religion and conviction. In this way, national marriage law for Muslims
is linked to sharia, and not to adat, which has, thus, been given a
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second-rate position. The Act further stipulates in Article 2(2) that all
marriages must be registered according to the existing law.
Legal uncertainty has surrounded cases when a marriage was con-
tracted in accordance with the religious rules, but was not officially re-
gistered as legally required. Was it still valid?33 Yes, said the Islamists,
the orthodox scholars, and their organisations. No, said the nationalists,
the modernists, most jurists, and their organisations. The question is
whether paragraph 1 of Article 2 supersedes paragraph 2 of the same ar-
ticle. Bowen maintains, to the contrary, that the Supreme Court has not
developed a stable corpus of case law on the issue (2003: 182-185).
Indecisively, the Supreme Court in 1991 sided with the no-camp, in
1993 with the yes-camp, only to switch sides again in 1995. According
to Bowen, the debate continues (2003: 182-185). In any case, it is possi-
ble for unrecorded marriages to be registered retroactively.
The legal ambiguity pervasive in this area may also have negative re-
percussions on related subjects, such as polygamy, divorce and mixed
marriages.
Interreligious marriages
Religiously mixed marriages remain one of the most problematic areas
of the marriage law. The legality or validity of marriages between a
Muslim man and a Christian woman or between a Christian man and a
Muslim woman in accordance with Article 2 of the Marriage Law is
sharply contested.
In the dominant interpretations of the sharia, the first case is permis-
sible (Muslim man marrying a non-Muslim woman), but the second is
not. Nonetheless, judicial decisions tend to show otherwise. In 1974,
the Supreme Court held that a marriage between a Muslim man and a
Christian woman is valid.34 In 1986, the Supreme Court reviewed a
case in which a Muslim woman had married a Christian man, holding
that such marriage was also valid.35 Oddly, though, in the latter case the
Court reasoned that the woman was supposed to give up her religion
by marrying a Christian.
A fatwa by the MUI (the Council of Indonesian Religious Scholars)
in 1980 declared both cases of interreligious marriage to be forbidden.
The Compilation also forbids any interreligious marriage.
Consequently, during the course of the 1990s, mixed marriages have
become increasingly difficult to legitimise. Yet, Justice Bismar Siregar
of the Supreme Court stated in 1994 that he was opposed to mixed
marriages as a Muslim, but that he did consider them legal as a judge
(Bowen 2003: 242-248). The rejected Counter Legal Draft also states
that the marriage between Muslims and Non-Muslims is permitted.
The matter has taken a new turn with Act 23/2006 on Civil
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Registration, which grants general courts the authority to legalise inter-
religious marriages.
In practice, the most common solution for Muslim-Christian couples
wishing to get married is for the Christian spouse to convert to Islam.
For a number of years, the organisation Paramadina, under the leader-
ship of the late liberal religious scholar Nurcholis Madjid, made it possi-
ble for interreligious marriages to be contracted. The method used by
this organisation was to first contract the marriage in accordance with
Islamic precepts, and afterwards to marry the couple according to the
other religion’s norms. Subsequently, the couple could register the mar-
riage at the civil registrar’s office in the local government. Neither the
husband nor the wife needed to convert in order to get married, and
this option was, therefore, frequently used.36 Civil registries are known,
however, to have refused registration of interreligious marriages.
Divorce and repudiation
This subsection will explain that Act 1/1974 has established two differ-
ent procedures for divorce. The first procedure assigns a central role to
the husband and comes close to a formal repudiation of the wife before
the court. The second procedure prescribes how the wife can obtain a
divorce from the court. The provisions for both procedures reflect ef-
forts to make a compromised text acceptable to both islamists and liber-
al reformers.
Two procedures
The drafters of the 1974 Marriage Act were forced to take a stance about
the unrestricted unilateral repudiation (talak) of the classical sharia and
options for women wishing to obtain a divorce on their own initiative.
Remarkably, the word talak is neither mentioned in the Act, nor in its
explanatory memorandum. Instead the Act regulates court procedures
for ‘divorce’ (perceraian). It is only in the explanatory memorandum to
GR 5/1975 regarding Article 14 that the legislator actually discloses that
one of the legal procedures for a Muslim man to obtain a divorce is
through repudiation (cerai talak). According to Article 38 of the 1974
Act on ‘dissolution of the marriage’ (putusnya perkawinan), a marriage
can be dissolved only in three ways, namely by death, by divorce, or by
a judicial decision. A Muslim man who goes through the divorce proce-
dure by unilateral repudiation, even though he always has to address a
judge, comes under the category of ‘divorce by repudiation’ (talak). In
contrast, Muslim women, who according to sharia must also address a
judge to obtain a divorce, come under the category of ‘suing for divorce’
(gugat cerai).
SHARIA AND NATIONAL LAW IN INDONESIA 465
Divorce by repudiation (talak)
With regard to the first procedure, the Act states: ‘Divorce can only be
effectuated in a court session after the court has tried to reconcile the par-
ties’ (italics added). The procedure for divorce through repudiation or
talak starts with a written application from the husband to the Religious
Court, explaining the reasons for his request. The court reviews
whether the conditions are met, and, if so, summons the petitioner and
his wife for reconciliation. If the court fails to reconcile the couple, re-
pudiation is pronounced by the husband or a representative before the
court. After the session, the presiding judge draws up a declaration that
records the divorce, which he then sends on to the Marriage Registrar.
The wife retains the right to appeal the talak.
Article 39(2) stipulates that such divorce ‘can only take place, if there
are sufficient grounds which make impossible the consensus which
ought to exist between husband and wife.’ The explanatory memoran-
dum to this article as well as Articles 19 and 14 of GR 9/1975 further
define the reasons for divorce. They include adultery; addiction, includ-
ing addiction to alcohol, opium use, or gambling; desertion; imprison-
ment; cruelty which inflicts damage; physical disability; and, finally,
continuous conflict and disruption of the marriage.
Suing for divorce (gugat cerai)
The 1974 Marriage Act provides for dissolution through ‘suing for di-
vorce’, as opposed to ‘divorce by repudiation’. It contains several proce-
dures for a judicial divorce to be obtained by the wife. The basic proce-
dure is provided for in Article 20 of GR 9/1975. Largely the same pro-
cedures, requirements, and grounds apply as those in cases initiated by
men (Art. 19). Many Religious Courts construe these procedures in
such a way as to also comply with sharia rules about divorce options for
women.
One option which is mentioned not in the law but in the
Compilation (Art. 45) and which conforms to sharia rules and is often
used in practice, is conditional repudiation (taklik talak). Prior to enter-
ing into a marriage, the groom assents to a number of conditions under
which he would automatically repudiate his wife. These conditions
would have to be proven in court. The practice of taklik talak is tradi-
tionally widespread in Indonesia – to the extent that the Ministry of
Religion has incorporated them since 1955 into the standard pre-printed
marriage certificate. The reasons for the use of taklik talak nowadays
conform to the abovementioned legislative grounds for divorce.
A second possibility for divorce is the syiqaq, a mediation procedure
that can be found in the classical sharia. A woman may use this
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procedure when requesting a divorce because of irreconcilable differ-
ences. A mediator representing the husband can pronounce a talak for
him (Cammack et al. 2007: 114). A third form of divorce is the fasakh,
which is more of a legal annulment than a divorce procedure. In the
classical sharia, this procedure tends to be used in cases of physical or
mental incapacity of the husband, a condition that is also listed in
Article 19(e) of GR 9/1975. A fourth possibility involves payment of a fi-
nancial compensation (khuluk) by the wife; Bowen calls this ‘divorce by
ransom’ (2003: 208).
Because these types of divorce exist in both religious and legal
sources, Religious Courts, when styling a dissolution taklik talak, syiqaq,
fasakh, or khuluk, are able to adhere to both normative systems at the
same time. In the eyes of conservative judges, the marriage legislation
has created new procedures, but the substance is still deeply inspired
by the sharia, which fundamentally grants the man stronger rights than
the woman. Nationalists and liberal reformers naturally disagree, and
they usually find the legislative texts as well as the Supreme Court rul-
ings on their side (Cammack 2003: 106-107).
Polygamy
The 1974 Marriage Act states in Article 3(1) that in principle a man can
be married to only one woman at the same time, and a woman to one
man only. The explanatory memorandum to the Act confirms that ‘the
act starts from the principle of monogamy.’ However, Article 3(1) also
establishes that ‘the [religious] court can give permission to a married
man to marry more than one wife, if this is the wish of the parties
concerned.’
The procedure for obtaining permission for a polygamous marriage
is laid down in Articles 4 and 5 of the Act, and Articles 40-44 of GR 9/
1975. In short, the man must submit a written application. The
Religious Court will only give permission if it finds that one out of
three substantive conditions is met:
– the wife cannot fulfil her duties as a wife;
– the wife is physically disabled or incurably ill; and/or
– the wife cannot give birth.
In addition, the law mentions in Article 5(1) three other requirements
of a more procedural nature:
– the wife must give her consent, unless this is not possible, or the
court does not deem it necessary;
– the man must prove that he is able to financially maintain his wives
and children, with a declaration from his employer, the tax agency,
or otherwise; and
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– the man must declare that he will give his wives and children a fair
and equal treatment.
Once the paperwork is filed, the court summons the petitioning hus-
band and wives. If it finds that the law’s conditions for polygamy are
fulfilled, it issues a decision permitting the polygamous marriage.
Without such decision, the Marriage Registrar at the KUA is forbidden
to register the marriage. If a man marries a second wife without a judi-
cial decision, he faces a fine. Likewise, the registrar who registers a
polygamous marriage without prior court permission faces sanction,
even imprisonment.
For civil servants, the law is more limited. Government Regulation
10/1983 (amended as GR 45/1990) forbids polygamous unions between
two civil servants altogether. Civil servants who want to enter into a
polygamous marriage with someone who is not state-employed must
obtain written permission from his or her superior. For these types of
marriages, another specified procedure is prescribed.
In practice, polygamy is fairly exceptional in Indonesia37, and it ac-
counts only for a very small part of the workload of the Religious
Courts. However, its symbolic and political importance is considerable,
deriving from the fact that it is considered as one of the milestones
along the way to ‘introducing the sharia’ into national law.
Research of judicial decision-making in polygamy cases in the 1980s
and 1990s suggests a difference in the holdings of lower Religious
Courts and the higher courts who are asked to review cases on appeal.
In a number of cases, courts wrongly granted permission for a polyga-
mous marriage, but these were subsequently reversed by the Supreme
Court (Otto & Pompe 1988: 14-15; Butt 1999: 128). This shows that the
law on polygamy remains contested. During the post-1998 years of lib-
eralisation new pro-polygamy voices came to the fore (Bowen 2003:
224-227). By contrast, in 2004, proponents of the Counter Legal Draft
strived for a complete removal of polygamy (Mulia 2007) and President
Yudhoyono declared that the abovementioned regulation, which bans
polygamy by civil servants, is to be ‘reactivated’ (see 10.4). The
Constitutional Court in its 2007 decision on polygamy mentioned
above in the subsection on human rights (see 10.5) basically confirmed
the balanced position of the 1974 legislation.
Inheritance law
There is no national legislation concerning inheritance law. The Islamic
inheritance law in force for Muslims in Indonesia is laid down in the
1991 Compilation of Islamic Law. This is an almost identical copy of
the dominant interpretations of sharia. The Religious Court has
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jurisdiction in inheritance affairs. Yet, several studies have revealed that
it is rare for inheritance cases to be brought before the Religious
Courts. Indeed, they form less than 1 per cent of the courts’ workload
(Cammack 2007: 164).
The Compilation includes the stipulation that when a person has
sons and daughters, the sons will in most cases each inherit twice the
share awarded each daughter. This contravenes a Supreme Court deci-
sion on adat inheritance law from 1961, which ruled that sons and
daughters in modern Indonesia should inherit equal amounts. The
abovementioned stipulation did not enter into the Compilation without
controversy, and remains contested.
Yahya Harahap, a judge on the Supreme Court, argued for instance
during the drafting process of the Compilation that an equal division of
inheritance between men and women would not conflict with the
Quran. The socio-economic position and role of women had changed,
after all, therefore making the traditional allotment old-fashioned and
outdated. The proposal offered by Harahap was, however, rejected by
most religious scholars, who did not wish to diverge from the dominant
interpretation (Cammack 1999: 30). Similarly, ex-Minister of Religious
Affairs Munawir (1983-1993) frequently pleaded for an equal division.38
He sometimes accused the ulama of hypocrisy in this matter (Bowen
2003: 161-165), maintaining that many religious scholars had told him
in private that they would equally divide between their children. And, in
fact, in practice, it appears that many Indonesians take measures to en-
sure that their property will be divided equally between sons and daugh-
ters because they consider this to be fairer than the prescriptions of
Islamic inheritance law.
However, the way in which the Compilation dealt with inheritance is-
sues, has left most classical rules unchanged. The few innovative parts
deal with joint marital property (harta bersama) – a concept unknown in
classical sharia – and inheritance by adopted children – who are typi-
cally not entitled to anything under Islamic inheritance rules. According
to the Compilation, adopted children, even if they have not been named
in the will of the deceased, are still entitled to up to one third of the to-
tal inheritance. Here Indonesia follows the model of the Egyptian in-
heritance law of 1946.
The 1989 Law on Religious Courts confirmed the longstanding free-
dom of choice of Indonesian Muslims to bring their inheritance dis-
putes before either the secular General Courts (pengadilan umum) or
the Religious Courts and to have them decided on the basis of national
law, adat law, or Islamic law. Article 49 of this law attributed jurisdic-
tion to the Religious Courts ‘in cases relating to wills, inheritance […]
that are carried out according to Islamic law’. During parliamentary de-
liberations about the bill, this was interpreted as an implicit basis for
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freedom of choice. It was then decided to lay this down in the General
Elucidation, thus stating that ‘[…] prior to the [initiation of the] case the
parties can choose which body of law shall be used in the division of
the estate’ (Cammack 2007: 159).
In an amendment of the 1989 law, by Act 3/2006, this freedom of
choice may have been reduced. At least, the general part of the elucida-
tion of the new Act suggests so in its citation of a phrase from the eluci-
dation of the old law that explicitly allows the parties’ freedom to choose
the applicable law and states that that phrase is abolished. On the other
hand, the new Article 49 does not clearly confirm any such change. It
does entrust the Religious Courts with the task and legal powers to set-
tle inheritance disputes between people ‘who adhere to the Islamic reli-
gion’. But, the elucidation of the new Article 49 states that the phrase
‘people (or entities) adhering the Islamic religion’ include those ‘who
have subjected themselves voluntarily to Islamic law concerning those mat-
ters which belong to the jurisdiction of Islamic courts […]’. The latter
clause suggests a continuation of the legal tradition of free choice of
law in inheritance matters. But the old provisions that deprived the
Religious Court of the power to decisively settle any dispute concerning
property, have now been removed.
Practices and trends in the Religious Courts
As a Religious Court has jurisdiction over marriage and divorce as well
as over inheritance matters and its legal position has changed with the
politico-religious tide, this section concludes with some observations
about three aspects of the changing role of Religious Courts. First, how
strictly do the courts follow the Marriage Act and the Compilation?
Secondly, to what extent are their decisions informed either by classical,
undulated sharia or by modern concepts of justice and equality between
men and women? And third, to what extent does the general public
make use of the Religious Courts, and why?
According to Butt (1999: 128), in most cases, the Religious Courts ap-
pear to comply with the marriage legislation. Where they have deviated,
for example in some polygamy cases (see above), the Supreme Court is
there to correct them. In-depth knowledge about the jurisprudence of
Religious Courts in Aceh is provided in Islam, law and equality in
Indonesia by Bowen (2003). The author undertook an anthropological
study spanning many years of practices and rulings of Religious and
General Courts in rural Aceh. From the research, it appears that in fa-
mily matters, the courts are primarily approached by women, and in
most of these cases they rule in their favour. Bowen explains that both
national legislation and Islamic law are more accommodating to the
rights of women than the rural adat prevalent in Aceh (Bowen 2003:
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84-88). While during the 1960s these courts had shown themselves to
be very sensitive to the consensus of rural communities,
[b]y the early 1990s, judges were emphasising the legal rights of
the individual Muslim, usually the Muslim wife or daughter […]
Some judges, jurists and many others have attempted to con-
struct an inclusive Islamic discourse that could take into account
norms of gender equality, the traditions of fiqh and, selectively,
adapt social norms (ibid 2003: 255-256).
The circulars and judgments of the Supreme Court in sharia-related
cases also indicate incremental attempts at liberalisation. Cammack
(2003: 109-110) cites Circular 2 of 1990, which emphasises that the role
of the religious judge in repudiation cases is not that of a witness,
whose task is merely to assess whether all conditions of the marriage
law have been abided by, but rather that of a judge who must adjudicate
in a matter involving two conflicting parties and who must resolve the
issue with a judicial decision.
In the Nur Said case originating in Aceh, in which the brother of a
deceased man demanded the entire inheritance, the Religious Court
decided that not only the brother, but also the only daughter of the de-
ceased would receive part of the inheritance. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, reversed this decision and argued that the child of the deceased
must inherit everything, regardless of whether the child was a son or a
daughter. Another inheritance case, Warsih vs. Iim, also demonstrates
that decision-making by a Religious Court is certainly not a matter of a
mechanical enforcement of sharia rules from the Compilation (Bowen
2003: 135-146). The judgment in this case does refer to the relevant arti-
cle of the Compilation, but instead of directly implementing it, the ar-
gumentation is centred on a number of social norms. In the ruling,
these norms are backed up by reference to ‘the current Islamic law that
is in force in Indonesia’, which is taken from four legal sources: the
Compilation, the traditions, the publications of a liberal Pakistani legal
scholar, and finally a Shafi’ite fiqh book. The Compilation is, thus, com-
plemented and legitimised by using other norms, carefully selected
from among many possible sources in order to achieve a socially accep-
table decision.
According to Nurlaelawati (2010: 143-144), judges in the Islamic
courts have generally followed the provisions of the Compilation of
Islamic Law in adjudicating cases before them. However, in some cases,
judges have ‘deviated’ from the Compilation and referred to fiqh in-
stead. Among the reasons is their intention to create public good (ma-
slahat) or to guarantee satisfaction of the parties through their judg-
ments. For reasons of legal justification, their decisions are then
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presented in such a way as to demonstrate conformity with the sources
of Islamic law. Another reason, according to Nurlaelawati’s evaluation,
is that a number of judges simply have not accepted all the reforms of
the Compilation. Thus, judges continue to produce legal uncertainty
and anomalous decisions. In contrast, both Bowen (2003, 2007) and
Cammack (2007) make a more positive assessment of the ‘deviations’,
arguing that they are mostly made on the grounds of fairness, justice,
public interest, or common good (see 10.4).
Cammack et al. (2007) estimate that at least in the 1970s and 1980s
‘no more than about half of all Muslim divorces [were actually] pro-
cessed through Islamic courts.’ These findings are confirmed by a
2008 study of the Supreme Court and AusAID (Sumner 2008).
Cammack et al. conclude that ‘practical considerations of costs, conveni-
ence, and knowledge of the law’s requirements are the principal rea-
sons for non-compliance with statutory divorce procedures’ as ‘costs of
adherence in terms of expense and inconvenience outweigh the per-
ceived benefits’ (ibid: 121). They found that ignorance of the law is a fac-
tor in the non-compliance of divorce procedures, though the
Indonesian government and a number of NGOs have disseminated
much information about it. Another factor is the unavailability of docu-
mentary proof of a marriage, as ‘[t]hose who enter into unapproved
marriages will invariably secure an unapproved divorce should the mar-
riage fail’ (ibid: 123).
Cammack et al. also explain why Indonesian Muslims find compli-
ance burdensome, writing:
The simplest divorce requires at least three court hearings […
and moreover] entail[s] a certain amount of paperwork and bu-
reaucratic annoyance. The parties must obtain a letter of resi-
dence from the local village head, and must present an original
state-issued marriage certificate. For most litigants, the court
staff translates the couple’s wishes into a cognizable legal claim
or claims, and complete forms that constitute the complaint or
petition. Additional procedures are sometimes required to give
notice to an absent spouse; the parties must secure the atten-
dance of witnesses; and the court may require documentary evi-
dence of the couple’s property (ibid 122-123).
In addition, litigants must pay fees for obtaining documents and addi-
tional informal payments. It would appear, therefore, that non-compli-
ance with the divorce rules contained in the Marriage Act of 1974 is pri-
marily the consequence of neglect and avoidance, rather than principled
rejection and refusal of the law itself (ibid: 125). Thus, the widespread
evasion of statutory divorce requirements should not be interpreted as a
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dramatic failure of the marriage act. In the words of Cammack et al.,
the ‘[c]hanges to the law that require reasons for divorce and grant in-
creased rights to wives are undoubtedly changing popular attitudes’
(ibid: 127).
10.7 Criminal law
The current criminal code of Indonesia is not Islamic in nature and de-
sign, and based on the French-Dutch legal tradition. It does not incor-
porate hadd crimes, Islamic corporal punishments, or retribution-based
sentencing. Apostasy is not a criminal offence under national law. This
being said, Indonesian law does include a few crimes that relate directly
or indirectly to Islam and sharia. Article 156 of the criminal code makes
the spreading of hatred, heresy, and blasphemy punishable by up to five
years in prison. Although the law applies to all officially recognised reli-
gions, it is usually invoked in cases involving blasphemy and heresy
against Islam.
Today’s criminal code is to be replaced by a new code. This draft bill,
which has been worked on for decades, was presented to the president
in January 2005, but has since been postponed and shelved several
times. Its presentation to parliament scheduled for 2008 was once
again postponed. The latest versions of the draft bill reflect the French-
Dutch legal tradition, with little reference to sharia except for a few pro-
visions pertaining to sexual morality and virtuous behaviour. These arti-
cles have been the subject of intense discussion for a number of years,
in part due to connotations with the sharia concept of zina. For exam-
ple, draft Article 484 makes extramarital sexual intercourse (zina) pun-
ishable with a prison sentence of up to five years or a substantial fine.
This offence could also be interpreted as covering homosexuality and
the living together of unmarried couples, while Article 486 of the draft
bill makes unmarried cohabitation punishable with a sentence of up to
two years or a proportionate fine. Incidentally, the penalisation of un-
married cohabitation is not a new development in Indonesia.39 Many
questions have been raised on the mutual relations between the two
provisions and on the imminent problems that will undoubtedly arise
concerning evidence in such cases.
The latest draft bill also prohibits kissing in public, a provision that
has been included in the chapter regarding virtuous behaviour. In addi-
tion to many moral objections, doubts have been raised with respect to
the viability of enforcement as well as the economic consequences in
areas that largely survive on the tourist industry like Bali. The Islamic
mass organisation NU has spoken out against these proposals, arguing
that the inclusion of elements of sharia into Indonesian criminal law
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would undermine social cohesion and tolerance. Several orthodox
Islamic parties and groups, on the other hand, have been eagerly propa-
gating stricter legislation in these areas for years.40
Beside the contested drafts of a new criminal code, three subjects de-
mand our attention here. First, the autonomous qanuns of Aceh; sec-
ondly, the criminalisation of behaviour that may disrupt interreligious
peace; and thirdly, the Anti-Pornography Act.
The special status of Aceh province, regulated by a 2006 national law
(see 10.4), has enabled the provincial government to make several
crimes punishable under Islamic law. The criminal provisions of those
provincial regulations or qanuns, take precedence over the criminal
code, and thus form an important exception (Lindsey & Hooker 2007:
245-249). Since 2005, sharia-based sanctions such as public flogging
have been applied occasionally in some of Aceh’s district towns.
Remarkably, since early 2007 no judicial order for such execution was
issued in the area of the provincial capital Banda Aceh.41
On 14 September 2009 Aceh’s legislative body, on the eve of its re-
placement by a newly elected council, passed a qanun on Islamic crim-
inal law (jinayat) and criminal procedure law. Article 24, section 1 of
this qanun regulates sanctions for adultery (zina). If it is proven that
adultery has been committed by two married persons, they are to be
stoned to death in a public place. In the case of unmarried persons,
they will each receive 100 lashes. However, it is unlikely that this qanun
is legally valid and can be implemented. The governor of Aceh, Irwandi
Yusef, has declared his strong and continuous objection to the regula-
tion. He stated that the regulation will never be implemented, that the
newly elected council will revise it, and that he will not approve it.42
According to Indonesian law, for the qanun to be valid the governor’s
consent during the making of a provincial regulation is required, as
well as his approval of the council’s decision to pass it. However, propo-
nents of the new regulation have contested this and maintain that the
qanun is already valid. Yet, the president of the Constitutional Court has
stated that the validity of the new qanun is still problematic from a legal
technical sense.43
Concerning the possible disturbance of interreligious harmony, a
Joint Decree of the ministers of Justice and Religious Affairs, dating
back to 1970, states that it is prohibited to convert people to a particular
religion in a region where another religion is prevalent (Bowen 2003:
236). Bearing in mind that Islam is the most common religion by far,
this decision can be seen as a form of official protection of Islam. A
joint decree from 2008 by the same ministers, warns and directs adher-
ents and leaders of the Ahmadiyya to refrain from religious practices
that deviate from mainstream Islam. Referring to Act 1 (PNPS) of 1965
on the Prevention of Abuse and/or the Defiling of Religions, the decree
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further states that non-compliance may lead to legal sanctions. The
same decree also warns opponents of Ahmadiyya to respect religious
communities and to refrain from illegal actions against this group, un-
der penalty of sanctions.
The 2008 Anti-Pornography Act, which was strongly promoted by
Islamist circles, bans images, gestures, or talk deemed to be porno-
graphic. The law has defined pornography very broadly as anything
‘which may incite obscenity, sexual exploitation and/or violate the moral
ethics of the community’. A section of the law allows members of the
public to ‘participate in preventing the spread of obscenity.’ In the be-
ginning of 2010, the Bandung police arrested four female dancers, who
were showing their underwear during a ‘sexy’ New Year’s dance perfor-
mance, and two men involved in the management of the alleged perfor-
mance. A senior Bandung policeman said the six could be charged un-
der the criminal code or the anti-pornography law, depending on the
prosecutors. Those convicted under the anti-pornography act can face a
maximum jail term of fifteen years. Rights groups have already lodged
a judicial review at the Constitutional Court demanding that the law be
dropped.44
10.8 Economic law and religious foundations
Following Law 3/2006, which extended the jurisdiction of Religious
Courts to economic sharia law, the Supreme Court issued a
Compilation of Economic Sharia Law (KHES) as an attachment to
Supreme Court Circular Letter 2/200845. Just like the Compilation of
Islamic Law (see 10.5), the KHES is not a law and does not impose
rules on citizens. Its four chapters address the following topics:
1. Legal Subjects and Property (subyek hukum dan harta);
2. Contract (akad);
3 Almsgiving (zakat) and Gifts (hibah); and
4. Sharia-based accountancy (Akuntansi Syari’ah).
The 796 articles of the KHES are formally based on legal sources and
principles of sharia, notably the Quran, the Sunna, custom (‘urf), and
consideration for the public interest (maslahat). In substance, this
Indonesian version of economic sharia has been adjusted to the policies
and rules of Indonesia’s national banking system and to practices on
the ground. Influence of sharia on Indonesia’s economic law can also
be found in laws regulating Islamic banking, Islamic taxation (zakat),
and religious charitable foundations (wakaf).
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Islamic banking law
In 2008, a new Sharia Banking Act was passed by parliament. Like its
predecessor (Act 10/1998), Law 21/2008 acknowledges the principles of
Islamic banking as constituting part of the national banking system46
and establishes the supervisory authority of the central bank to ensure a
healthy and proper regulatory environment surrounding the Islamic
banking sector. In addition to the country’s central bank (Bank
Indonesia), the MUI (see 10.3) has certain powers concerning sharia
banking.47 The law provides for the MUI to lay down the relevant prin-
ciples of sharia in fatwas. A committee composed of officials from Bank
Indonesia, the Ministry of Religion, and ‘sharia experts’ is to incorpo-
rate these fatwas into the Bank’s regulations. Observers have pointed
out the danger of conflicting opinions between the two agencies.
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the national policy and super-
vision of Islamic banking will primarily fall under the jurisdiction of
Bank Indonesia. For example, a regulation issued in the summer of
2005 required that all rurally-based sharia banks draw up monthly re-
ports in accordance with strict guidelines; these reports are to be sub-
mitted for approval by Bank Indonesia. Forms of Islamic insurance,
stockbrokers, mortgage providers, and micro credit institutions have
also quickly begun to expand and now also fall under the financial
supervision of Bank Indonesia.
Almsgiving law or Islamic taxation
The Zakat Administration Law 38/1999 regulates the management of
alms paid for the poor (zakat). This law does not establish an enforce-
able obligation for Muslims to pay zakat. Rather, it is targeted toward
the unification, centralisation, and coordination of the numerous exist-
ing public and private zakat institutions. It is hoped that the act will in-
crease the amount of zakat payments, direct zakat funds to social wel-
fare for the poor, strengthen the legal basis of zakat collection, and
boost participation levels and the religiosity of Indonesians in general
(Salim 2008: 128). The law primarily deals with the tasks and powers of
the National Zakat Agency (BAZNAS) for the management of zakat,
but it also covers private zakat-related institutions. Furthermore, the law
makes zakat a tax-deductible expense for both private individuals and
firms. This has raised criticism that the law discriminates against fol-
lowers of other religions for whom no similar tax-deductible regulations
exist. Minister of Religion Munawir stated in 2001 that similar concepts
existing in other religions shall be taken into consideration in the fu-
ture; for the moment, however, priority lies with properly managing the
zakat (ibid: 138).
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Law on religious foundations (wakaf )
A wakaf is a religious foundation endowed by the founders with real es-
tate and/or tangible goods to be used in the interest of the community.
Act 41/2004 concerning wakaf established the independent Indonesian
Wakaf Agency (‘Badan Wakaf Indonesia’, abbreviated as BWI) and
charged it with the supervision of those who manage wakafs.
Government Regulation 42/2006 provides the substantive and proce-
dural rules for wakaf administration and corresponds with Part III of
the Compilation of Islamic Law, also dealing with wakaf. Local offices of
the Ministry of Religion, the so-called KUAs (see 10.2, 10.5), are respon-
sible for the registration of wakaf and report to both the Ministry of
Religion and the BWI. The BWI has the power to discharge or replace
the wakaf management and to decide in matters concerning the status
of a wakaf. The Minister of Religion and the MUI exercise advisory
powers only. Jurisdiction in matters pertaining to wakaf rests with the
Religious Courts.
10.9 International treaty obligations concerning human
rights
We have pointed out above that some provisions in Indonesia’s sharia-
based national law are in conflict with its human rights law (see 10.5).
In this section we examine whether Indonesia has ratified the main hu-
man rights treaties and whether, in doing so, it has entered into inter-
national legal obligations affecting its sharia-related domestic laws. In
particular, we will note how the monitoring bodies of those treaties have
assessed Indonesia’s fulfilment of its duties under international law.
Indonesia ratified CEDAW in 1984, including its optional protocol.
In doing so, the country made no reservations, and, therefore, agreed to
the treaty principles affirming equality between men and women.
Indonesia ratified the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in 1998 and,
finally, in September 2005 the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). The National Commission for Human Rights
(Komnasham) has played a major role in promoting such ratifications,
and drawing attention to their legal consequences, such as Indonesia’s
obligation to report periodically to the monitoring bodies of those trea-
ties. While the post-1998 democratic reforms have been hailed as re-
markable improvements in human rights, concerns have been raised
about stagnation in the law reform process regarding the status of wo-
men and about the introduction of sharia-based criminal law in Aceh.
In 2007, in response to Indonesia’s periodic progress report, the in-
ternational CEDAW Committee expressed its concern that
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the discriminatory provisions in the Marriage Act of 1974 […]
perpetuate stereotypes by providing that men are the heads of
households and women are relegated to domestic roles.48
The Committee further noted that the law allows for polygamy and sets a
legal minimum age of marriage at 16 for girls and that in general there
is a ‘lack of progress in the law reform process with respect to marriage
and family law, which allows the persistence of discriminatory provisions
that deny women equal rights with men’ (CEDAW 2007). Since the time
of the Committee’s previous report on Indonesia, where similar conclud-
ing comments were made, amendments to the discriminatory provisions
of the Marriage Act (1974) have not been undertaken. This prompted the
Committee to request that the Indonesian government ‘take immediate
steps to revise the Marriage Act of 1974 in accordance with its obligations
under the Convention’, to which Indonesian representatives expressed
their intention to amend the law without further delay (ibid).
Members of the Committee further urged Indonesia to address wo-
men and their role in marriage and family relations in a comprehensive
strategy for the elimination of discrimination. It noted with particular
concern that the government’s decentralisation policy had ‘resulted in
the uneven recognition and enforcement of women’s human rights and
discrimination against women in some regions, including Aceh’ (ibid).
It also took note of ‘the rise of religious fundamentalist groups advocat-
ing restrictive interpretations of sharia law, which discriminate against
women, in several regions of the country’ and concluded that:
[The Indonesian government] has rescinded a number of local
laws and regulations pertaining to economic matters such as
taxes, but has failed to rescind local laws that discriminate
against women on the basis of religion, including laws regulat-
ing dress codes, which are disproportionately enforced against
women (ibid).
In 2008, the international Committee against Torture convened to
monitor the implementation of the CAT in Indonesia.49 They expressed
deep concern that local regulations, such as the Aceh Criminal Code,
adopted in 2005, introduced corporal punishment for certain new of-
fences and furthermore that ‘the enforcement of such provisions is un-
der the authority of a “morality police”, the Wilayatul Hisbah, which ex-
ercises an undefined jurisdiction and whose supervision by public State
institutions is unclear’ (ibid). The Committee also concluded that:
the necessary legal fundamental safeguards do not exist for per-
sons detained by such officials [and] the execution of punishment
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in public and the use of physically abusive methods (such as flog-
ging or caning) […] contravene the Convention and national law.
In addition, it is reported that the punishments meted out by this
policing body have a disproportionate impact on women (arts. 2
and 16). The State party should review all its national and local
criminal legislations, especially the 2005 Aceh Criminal Code50,
that authorize the use of corporal punishment as criminal sanc-
tions, with a view to abolishing them immediately, as such pun-
ishments constitute a breach of the obligations imposed by the
Convention […].
It is hard to assess the impact of such conclusions of international com-
mittees on domestic decision-making in Indonesia. While certain
groups and institutions, including the departing provincial council of
Aceh in September 2009, choose to ignore, if not defy, the calls from
these international human rights committees, the latter’s conclusions
have certainly added weight to the claims of moderate politicians and
human rights defenders and are reflected in the policies of Aceh’s pre-
sent governor who belongs to the local Partai Aceh, which presently has
the majority, as well as in the post-2007 judicial policy in Banda Aceh.
10.10 Conclusion
Has Indonesia’s moderate Islam, for which the country has been
known since long ago, changed to the extent that puritan forces and in-
terpretations of sharia have pervaded national law? Several develop-
ments point in that direction. The jurisdiction of Religious Courts has
increased; new national laws on Islamic economic law – banking, taxa-
tion, almsgiving – have been promulgated; two major Compilations of
Islamic law have been issued by the government; inter-religious mar-
riages have become difficult to pursue and legally dubious at best; reli-
gious freedom for Ahmadiyya has been curbed due to pressure from
puritan groups; and Aceh introduced sharia-based law even in criminal
matters. It is also notable that through a variety of regional regulations
(the so-called PerDa Syariah), individual freedoms enjoyed by citizens –
to dress as they want, to move when they want, to eat and drink as they
like, to pursue religious studies as they like – have been curtailed in
quite a number of districts, towns and provinces.
Yet, in a recent book on islamisation of Indonesia’s law, Salim has raised
an important question about the essence of these legal changes, namely
whether they can be qualified as islamisation or Indonesianisation? He ar-
gues that:
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The Islamization of laws in Indonesia […] is not a real or com-
plete introduction of shari’a. What on the surface appears to be
the Islamization of laws in Indonesia is in reality a symbolic to-
ken for the most part. […] [I]t is also an Indonesianization of
sharia law that is currently taking place. This means that the
Islamization of laws in Indonesia entails in part practical secu-
larization of shari’a, namely human interference through parlia-
mentary enactment in creating religious obligations that have
non-divine character (Salim 2008: 177).
Salim is certainly right in stating that the introduction of sharia in
Indonesia is not ‘complete’. It should be realised that in Indonesia the
bigger part of law has undergone little or no visible influence from
Islam. Indonesia’s constitution has remained secular, as have most of
its codifications, whether in administrative law, criminal law, civil law,
or laws of procedure. ‘Islam’ and ‘sharia’ lack a constitutional status as
such.
Salim also states that the islamisation of laws in Indonesia is not a
‘real’ introduction of sharia. In his view, most of the abovementioned le-
gal changes can also be interpreted as successful efforts by the state to
incorporate, subjugate, and control Islamic law as a subsidiary part of
national law and governance. Actually, I subscribe to this view, which,
ironically, is probably shared by many discontented puritans as well.
The powers of Religious Courts have indeed expanded. Yet, whereas
these courts used to be supervised by the Ministry of Religion, a tradi-
tional bulwark of religious scholars, they have now come under the con-
trol of the Supreme Court, which of old has been a stronghold of pro-
fessional jurists. Previously, Islamic banking, almsgiving, and the man-
agement of religious foundations were private matters, but they too are
now regulated and supervised by national agencies.
From the above paragraph it may seem that islamisation of law
should be understood simply as the outcome of a struggle between state
institutions and religious scholars. Here, one should distinguish be-
tween two main politico-religious forces, namely moderates and puri-
tans. Since Independence, the Indonesian government itself has been
dominated by moderate nationalists. Both Soekarno and Suharto were
essentially moderate Javanese Muslims, as were their successors. An
important legislative achievement of Suharto’s New Order regime was
the 1974 Marriage Act. It was, and still is, the mainstay of sharia-based
law. The 1974 law is a compromise between the government’s previous
drafts – which were decidedly more liberal – and the demands of a
fierce puritan opposition. Despite ambivalent legislation and ongoing
problems of implementation, the law brought an end to the unlimited
freedom of Muslim men to divorce their wives at will and to take a
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second, third, or fourth wife as they liked. It assigned the Religious
Courts the power to decide whether a man had good reasons for a di-
vorce or a next marriage. The law also almost equalised divorce proce-
dures for men and women. Thus, in spite of puritan resistance over the
past quarter of a century, the law of divorce by the Indonesian courts
has been gradually and quietly transformed (Cammack et al. 2007: 126-
127).
The processes of legal change, to which Salim refers in the above ci-
tation as ‘Indonesianization’ of shari‘a law and elsewhere ‘nationaliza-
tion of shari‘a’ (Salim 2008: 2), go a long way back indeed. In pre-colo-
nial Java, the sultans of Yogyakarta and Solo converted to Islam and su-
pervised the administration of justice by their religious officials
(panghulus). The Dutch already began in 1882 to formalise Islamic
councils, thus charging state-controlled bodies with the application of
Islamic law, in subservience to the secular, general state courts. After
Independence, Sukarno’s new government first transformed the Dutch
colonial office for religious affairs into a Ministry of Religious Affairs to
supervise Islamic affairs. Since Islamist forces such as Darul Islam
posed serious threats to the young republic, the government tended to
fear puritans, and to fight the militants among them. Hazairin’s
scheme to establish as a fifth Sunni school of Islamic law, the so-called
Madhab Indonesia, expressed the ambitions and hopes of moderate
Muslim legal scholars that Islam, local adat and a national legal tradi-
tion could go hand in hand. Such ideas were not welcomed, though, by
puritan scholars, who since the 1970s came under the increasing influ-
ence of transnational Salafist propaganda from the Middle East, espe-
cially from Saudi Arabia.
Under Suharto’s New Order, the government first did its utmost best
to control and oppress religious opposition. To this end, it set up the
MUI as a national ulama organisation and the PPP as an Islamic politi-
cal party, and it expanded and further formalised the Religious Courts
as part of the national judicial system. In the 1990s, when opposition
against his increasingly oppressive and corrupt regime mounted,
Suharto started to provide support to Islamist movements and organisa-
tions such as ICMI. Several Islamic scholars including NU-chairman
Abdurrahman Wahid played a leading role in the pro-democracy and
pro-rule-of-law forces that led to Suharto’s fall. Suharto’s vice president
and successor Habibie enacted several laws to regulate Islamic affairs
(see 10.4).
The next presidents, Wahid himself, then Megawati, and presently
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), arranged for a formidable increase
in democracy and human rights. Indonesia ratified major human rights
conventions without reservations, the army returned to the barracks,
and the civil war between the army and the Free Aceh Movement was
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successfully ended with a peace agreement. Free elections on national
and local levels now saw secular as well as Islamic parties bid for the
public’s favour.
Generally speaking, secular parties such as PDI, Golkar, and PD have
been far more successful than Islamic parties such as PPP, PKB, PAN,
and PBB. In elections neither of them has made sharia a big issue. In
1999 and 2004, nationalist parties like Golkar and PDI and the secular-
oriented Islamic party PKB were the winners. In 2009, president
Yudhoyono’s Partai Demokrat won many votes. The Islamist PKS,
which has become increasingly popular for its sense of decency and dis-
cipline, had success in 2004, but in 2009 it did not make the major
breakthrough some had expected. It now seems to prefer the model of
the Turkish AK party, which promotes democracy and economic
growth, over the model of the more puritan Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood. As Azra noted, in the elections PKS leaders concentrated
their political discourse on socio-economic subjects (2004: 12-14).
Remarkably, the promotion of sharia-based legislation, both in Aceh
as well as in other provinces and districts, has largely been driven by
non-Islamist parties such as Golkar and PDI (Bush 2008). Similarly,
Aceh’s turn to the sharia, based on 2001 and 2006 laws enacted in
Jakarta, did not unequivocally express the strong demand of all
Acehnese. On the contrary, when after the Peace Agreement the Free
Aceh Movement had turned into a regular political party, and this newly
formed Partai Aceh won the 2009 elections, they opposed the radical
turn to sharia-based law. Governor Yusef Wanandi personally opposed
the 2009 stoning regulation, which remains contested.
The election results confirm what had already been observed by so-
cio-legal scholars. In spite of all attention drawn by puritan movements,
and notwithstanding opinion polls reporting that a majority of
Indonesians want to ‘introduce the sharia’,51 legal development at the
grassroots level is often marked by pragmatism. Backstage, throughout
the country, numerous administrators, officials, judges, lawyers, and
above all the common people are attempting in most cases to pragmati-
cally utilise and blend the different normative systems in such a man-
ner that they are able to achieve desirable solutions.
As Bowen (2003: 255-257) has observed in rural Aceh and elsewhere,
Religious Courts in particular successfully attempt to construct an in-
clusive Islamic discourse that can take into account norms of gender
equality (human rights) and the traditions of fiqh, as well as social
norms prevailing in society. An obvious reason for common people to
turn to the Religious Courts is their good reputation in terms of accessi-
bility, integrity, and delivery of justice. For the time being, Religious
Courts are preferred over General Courts, which are known for their
corruption.
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Indonesia is presently conducting a unique experiment with demo-
cratic law-making in the context of cultural islamisation. In this process,
it has been responding both to Islamist pressure and the call to respect
human rights.
On the one hand, puritan groups have become more vocal, more
‘mainstream’, and more influential than in the past. Some groups like
FPI still use intimidation and violence to achieve their goals, unfortu-
nately with incidental successes. Education programmes in the Middle-
East and other exchanges with the Muslim world have created transna-
tional networks and, as such, channels for dissemination of Saudi
funds and puritan ideas. It also cannot be ignored that in the wake of
Suharto’s fall, Islam became for many Indonesians a symbol for the
modern, self-conscious citizen and a political statement against New
Order practices – against oppression and corruption, and for justice
and human rights. While wearing the veil could indeed reflect oppres-
sion of women in some cases, for other women the veil became a sym-
bol of seriousness, maturity, and social ambition (Brenner 1996).
On the other hand, the long tradition of most Indonesian Muslims
being moderate traditionalists has not disappeared altogether. Many
have associated themselves with their local adat, with local Sufi move-
ments, with traditionalist and social service organisations such as the
NU, and with the belief in the spirits of their ancestors and other spiri-
tual forces. Among bureaucrats, politicians, military, police, judges,
business, NGOs, academics, artists, intellectuals, journalists, and stu-
dents, many favour national unity, economic growth, democracy, and
human rights as the best path to socio-economic development. This
large group has always been opposed to the strict implementation and
enforcement of laws based on classical sharia.
In 2009, a team of Islamic scholars, representing two powerful mass
movements, namely the NU and the Muhammadiyyah, and led by the
late Abdurrahman Wahid, published a book entitled Ilusi Negara Islam
(The Illusion of an Islamic State). This book carefully documents the
ways in which Saudi-funded Salafi puritans have tried to infiltrate
Indonesia’s public and private institutions. It contains strong condem-
nations of such infiltration from both Islamic organisations, calling it
an attack on Indonesia’s society and culture. Judging from the above-
mentioned election results, these views are actually backed by a prag-
matic, silent majority that has consistently supported moderate parties
and politicians.
As Azra (2004: 12-14) has argued, terrorist bomb attacks have led most
Indonesians to strongly condemn radicalism and have instilled in them
a resolute will to tackle this problem. At the same time, most
Indonesians are not willing to sever the connections with their Islamic
SHARIA AND NATIONAL LAW IN INDONESIA 483
traditions. Against this background, the position and role of sharia-
based law are bound to remain ambiguous and contested, moving back
and forth in the decades to come as they have done in the recent past.
Notes
1 The author is professor of law and governance in developing countries at Leiden
University, the Netherlands. He wishes to thank Adriaan Bedner, John Bowen, Mark
Cammack, and Andrew Harding for their valuable comments on previous versions of
this chapter. He also thanks Stijn van Huis for his extensive research assistance and
his meticulous documentation of post-2007 legal developments, notably in the area
of economic law.
2 An earlier version of the historical part of this chapter was published in Otto 2009b.
3 The term adat law (in Dutch adatrecht) was first used by Snouck Hurgronje in order
to describe local customs (adat) that fulfilled a legal function; he referred to ‘adats,
which have legal effect’ (Snouck Hurgronje 1893: 357). The argumentation for using
adat law as a standard legal concept was developed by Van Vollenhoven, for example
in Het adatrecht van Nederlandsch-Indië (1918: 8).
4 Javanese informants may possibly not have been very clear either, used as they were
to present themselves to the outside world as adherents of a specific religion, while
in private embracing a body of syncretic, pluralistic convictions (Ball 1981: 24).
Today, this tendency has not altogether disappeared.
5 In the Netherlands, the Batavian Republic was proclaimed in 1795 in the wake of the
1789 French Revolution. In France, during the first years of the nineteenth century,
Napoleon directed the unification and codification of customs and regulations and
modernised the government, the economy, and the military. As France’s political and
cultural influence increased also in the Netherlands, the drive for codification also
took hold there.
6 Both scholars were proponents of the legal theory of receptio in complexu, the total
embracement of the complete corpus of religious Islamic law. Later on, this theory
became subject to devastating attacks by Snouck Hurgronje.
7 Royal Decree of 19 January 1882, regarding the Religious Councils on Java and
Madura, published in the official gazette (Staatsblad) 82-152 jo. 153. The official name
of the councils was ‘Priests Councils’ (in Dutch Priesterraden).
8 From 1891 until 1898, he served as advisor to the Governor-General on ‘Oriental lan-
guages and Muhammadan law’ and from 1898 until 1906 he was the Adviser for
‘Native and Arab affairs’. Subsequently, he was appointed as professor of Arabic in
Leiden.
9 This reception theory formed a reaction to the older theory of receptio in complexu, as
defended by nineteenth century authors (see supra n. 6).
10 In Indonesian Islam, Hooker (2003) compares fatwas by the Muhammadiyah, NU,
and Persis with those of the national council of religious scholars (the MUI), which
was established later (see 10.3).
11 Here the courts in first instance were called ‘Kadi’s Council’ (Kerapatan Qadi) while
the court of appeals was called ‘High Kadi’s Council’ (Kerapatan Qadi Besar), see
Cammack 2007: 147.
12 Wakap or wakaf: the Indonesian term for waqf (Arabic) or religious endowment. It re-
fers to property that, in accordance with the rules of the sharia, is set aside for reli-
gious or social purposes and is administered by a kind of foundation.
13 This did not go as far as the recent autonomy laws on Aceh of 2001 and 2006.
484 JAN MICHIEL OTTO
14 Under Sukarno’s rule, Indonesia left the United Nations in January 1965 in protest
of Malaysia’s becoming a temporary member of the Security Council. In September
1966, under Suharto, Indonesia reassumed membership (Cribb & Brown 1997: 86,
116).
15 See Article 10 of Act 14/1970; In Indonesia, since colonial times, the term ‘religious
jurisdiction’ has referred to jurisdiction for Muslims.
16 The enactment of the implementing Government Regulation 9/1975 only partially re-
solved this uncertainty (see 10.6).
17 Progressive Indonesian jurists were involved in the drafting of regulations on Islamic
banking, sponsored in part by USAID, the official American aid agency.
18 Both Wahid and Rais were to form political parties: Wahid the PKB, based on the old-
er NU; and Rais, the PAN, which had more in common with the old Masyumi party.
19 In 2002 the PPP and other small Islamic parties proposed to revise the constitution
in order to make Indonesia an Islamic state. In August of the same year, the MPR
(People’s Consultative Assembly) rejected this proposal, with the support of the NU
and the Muhammadiyah.
20 The Laskar Jihad was the biggest and probably best organised movement among the
Islamic militias. Another organisation, the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela
Islam, or FPI) executed countless attacks on bars, brothels, and nightclubs in Jakarta
and its environs. The Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI) is mentioned in relation to the attacks on
Bali, and the Southeast Asian cell of Al-Qaeda. For an overview of these three organi-
sations see Van Bruinessen 2002. In 2003, the perpetrators of the Bali attack, all of
them members of the JI, were convicted and sentenced to death. In 2005 Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir, suspected to be the spiritual leader of the JI and of the attacks on Bali was
convicted to thirty months imprisonment. Besides these three organisations, a num-
ber of networks, often operating underground, have taken up the fight for an Islamic
state. They have once again united under the name Darul Islam or NII/TII (abbrevia-
tions for Islamic State of Indonesia/Islamic Army of Indonesia). In addition, local ra-
dical organisations have often been active, such as the Laskar Jundullah in southern
Sulawesi (ibid). On 10 November 2008, the men who had carried out the Bali bomb
attack, Amrozi, Imam Samudera, and Ali Gufron were executed. New suicide bomb-
ings took place on 17 July 2009 in two Jakarta hotels killing nine people. In
September 2009, Indonesia’s most wanted Islamist militant Noordin Top, the sus-
pected mastermind of violent bomb attacks, was finally traced and killed during a po-
lice raid in Solo. The Economist concluded in late 2008 that ‘Indonesia is, overall,
edging away from radical Islamism. But the trend is not irreversible, and the authori-
ties must avoid fostering fundamentalists by pandering to them’ (Economist 2008).
21 To explain this, it is sometimes argued that court procedures are time-consuming,
complicated, and expensive (Cammack 2007). Furthermore, a lack of knowledge of
rights and duties is cited, despite the fact that the Ministry of Religion has local advi-
sory offices that offer every prospective couple information about their rights and
duties.
22 In the concluding section of this chapter, I will point out that throughout Indonesia
politicians of secular nationalist parties have been involved in the introduction of
sharia-related regulations. In the case of Aceh the party which represents most vo-
ters, the Partai Aceh, has spoken out against this islamisation of law.
23 An earlier version of sections 10.5 and 10.6 was published in Otto 2009a.
24 Amended first in 2006, and for the second time by Law 50/2009.
25 Act 35/1999 was aimed at making the judiciary more independent from the executive
by removing some of the influence held by ministries with supervisory powers.
While the other special courts were granted five years in order to prepare administra-
tively for the changes, an exception was made for the Religious Courts following
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protests by the Ministry of Religion and the MUI. According to appended Article 11
(A), section 2, no time limit was imposed on the Religious Courts (Salim 2003: 215-
216).
26 IAINs (State Academies of Islamic Sciences) have for many years been the main in-
stitutes of higher education in Islamic studies. In 2002, a number of them were ele-
vated so that they are now ‘National Islamic Universities’ (UIN).
27 For a more detailed description and analysis of the historical development of this
ministry, see Boland 1982. For many years, the Directorate for the Development of
Religious Courts did essentially fulfill the function of a court of appeals in religious
affairs. Since 1965, the Supreme Court has formally become the national court of ap-
peals in religious matters; nonetheless, the supervisory role of the directorate contin-
ued for many years (Hooker 2003: 37-38) until it was abolished with the complete
transfer of the sector of Religious Courts to the Supreme Court in 2004.
28 In 1958, the Ministry of Religion issued a Circular Letter indicating thirteen fiqh-texts
of the Shafi’ite school to be used by the Religious Courts. This canon has effectively
been in use until present times.
29 This is, for instance, the case in the stipulation that in cases where the only child of
deceased parents is female, she inherits the entire estate when both of her parents
die. This progressive interpretation was also followed by the Supreme Court in judg-
ments made in 1995, 1996, and 1998. In contrast, the widely held traditional inter-
pretation of sharia was that in such cases, the brothers and sisters of the deceased
would also inherit a portion of the estate. This has now been pushed aside (Bowen
2003: 195-199).
30 Decision 12/PUU-V/2007.
31 It remained unclear what the scope and meaning of this provision would be.
Prosecutor General Marzuki made it known that it could only pertain to private law
and not to criminal law. PKB leader Wahid was of the opinion that it was about the
underlying principles of the sharia, and not about the actual content. What was clear
was that various parties used this question to score political points, especially the
PKB towards the PDI, and not so much to resolve the real problems afflicting Aceh
(Salim 2003: 227).
32 For the content of these qanuns see Ichwan 2007: 205-214.
33 The legal requirement of registration, complete with a criminal penalisation, is not
contested. However, negligence and liability to punishment do not immediately and
in all cases imply that the marriage would be invalid.
34 Supreme Court decision 1650/K/Sip/1974, dated 13 November 1979, cited in Pompe
1991.
35 Supreme Court decision 1400K/Pdt/1986, dated 1989, cited in ibid.
36 Personal communication from a lawyer in Bandung, March 2005.
37 Practices of men secretly marrying their mistresses are not uncommon, though. In
this way sharia is used by men to legitimise their unfaithful behaviour. This, in turn,
often becomes a reason for the first wife to seek divorce.
38 Former Minister of Religious Affairs Munawir, for example, made no secret of the
fact that in his testament, he had made sure that all heirs, whether male or female,
would inherit the same amount, adding that many Islamic leaders had made the
same arrangements (Bowen 2003: 159-165; Cammack 1999).
39 In the 1990s, several cases led to convictions. On the one hand the prosecutors called
on an interpretation of Article 378 of the colonial criminal code, in which ‘stealing’
the honour of a woman was made punishable, and on the other hand they called on
adat law (Pompe 1994). Unmarried cohabitation is socially unacceptable in many
areas of Indonesia. In traditional areas, couples living together are sometimes at-
tacked and beaten by furious crowds. It is plausible that the government, by
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criminalising unmarried cohabitation, is trying to retain the initiative and to thereby
prevent such incidents from recurring.
40 On this, see articles in Tempo, February 2005; The Jakarta Post, 11 October 2003;
Republika, 30 March 2005.
41 Personal communication by Benjamin Otto, December 2009. A master student at
Free University, Amsterdam, he carried out research about the implementation of
Aceh’s sharia criminal law in the capital Banda Aceh, during Spring and Summer of
2009.
42 ‘Standoff over Aceh Stoning Legislation’, Jakarta Globe, 25 October 2009.
43 ‘Qanun Jinayat Perlu Diatur Teknis Hukumnya’, Serambi, 15 September 2009.
44 ‘“Sexy Dancer” arrests condemned by Indonesian feminists’, Jakarta Globe, dated 8
January 2010.
45 The Supreme Court had formed a committee to draft the Compilation of Economic
Sharia Law. Experts of the central bank (Bank Indonesia), the MUI’s national sharia
board, experts in Islamic economic law, and judges of both Religious and General
Courts shared their views during the drafting process.
46 Prior to 1992, it was not legally permissible to manage bank deposits without paying
out interest (Hefner 2003: 153). Banking Law 7/1992 implicitly allowed Islamic bank-
ing, especially through implementing Government Regulation 72/1992, which paved
the way for a dual banking system. At the initiative of the national council of reli-
gious scholars (MUI), ‘the Bank Muamalat Indonesia’ (BMI) was established. In the
years until 1988, dozens of rural banks attained the status of ‘rural sharia bank’.
After 1998, the number of Islamic financial institutions rose sharply (Bank
Indonesia 2002).
47 See Republika OnLine: http://www.republika.co.id/, dated 4 May 2005.
48 See CEDAW (2007), ‘Concluding comments of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women: Indonesia’, para.s 18, 19. CEDAW/C/IDN/CO/5, da-
ted 10 August.
49 See CAT (2008), Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture,
Indonesia’, para. 15. CAT/2/IDN/CO/2, dated 2 July.
50 Here the committee probably meant to refer to Act 11/2006 on the special autonomy
of Aceh (see 10.4).
51 In June 2008 such polls were published by Australia’s Roy Morgan Research.
Esposito and Mogahed (2007) discuss similar Gallup polls, and explain why the
press reports on such outcomes are usually misleading.
Bibliography
Azra, A. (2004), ‘Indonesian Islam, election politics and beyond’, Niasnytt 4: 12-14.
Azra, A. (2007), ‘Islamic legal education in modern Indonesia’, in R.M. Feener & M.E.
Cammack (eds.), Islamic Law in contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and Institutions, 257-270.
Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press.
Ball, J. (1981), Indonesian law: Commentary and teaching materials. Sydney: University of
Sydney.
Ball, J. (1982), Indonesian legal history, 1602-1848. Sydney: Oughtershaw Press.
Bank Indonesia (2002), The blueprint of Islamic banking development in Indonesia. Jakarta:
Bank Indonesia.
Bartleby (2010), ‘Indonesia’, in World Factbook, see http://www.bartleby.com/151/country/id.
html (2008 statistics) and https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/id.html (online edition, last accessed February 2010). Washington, D.C.: Central
Intelligence Agency.
SHARIA AND NATIONAL LAW IN INDONESIA 487
Boland, B.J. (1982), The struggle of Islam in modern Indonesia. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Bowen, J. (2003), Islam, law and equality in Indonesia: An anthropology of public reasoning.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bowen, J. (2007), ‘Fairness and law in an Indonesian court’, in R.M. Feener and M.E.
Cammack (eds.), Islamic law in contemporary Indonesia. Ideas and Institutions, 170-192.
Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press.
Brenner, S. (1996), ‘Reconstructing self and society: Javanese Muslim women and “the veil”’,
American Ethnologist 23(4): 673-697.
Bruinessen, M. van (2002), ‘The violent fringes of Indonesia’s Islam’, isim Newsletter 11: 7.
Burns, P. (1999), The Leiden legacy: Concepts of law in Indonesia. Jakarta: Pradnya Paramita.
Bush, R. (2008), Local Sharia regulations in Indonesian Districts – trending and implications, pa-
per presented at the workshop ‘Studying Islam in Southeast Asia: State of the art and
new approaches’, organised under the auspices of the Australia-Netherlands Research
Collaboration (ANRC), in co-operation with the International Institute for the Study of
Islam in the Modern World (ISIM), Leiden, 7-8 July 2008.
Butt, S. (1999), ‘Polygamy and mixed marriage in Indonesia: The application of the mar-
riage law in the Courts’, in T. Lindsey (ed.), Indonesia: Law and society, 122-144.
Leichhart, New South Wales: The Federation Press.
Cammack, M. (1999), ‘Inching toward equality: Recent developments in Indonesian inheri-
tance law’, Indonesian Law and Administration Review 5(1): 19-50.
Cammack, M. (2003), ‘Indonesia’s 1989 Religious Judicature Act’, in A. Salim & A. Azra
(eds.), Shari’a and politics in modern Indonesia, 96-124. Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies.
Cammack, M. (2007), ‘The Indonesian Islamic judiciary’, in R.M. Feener & M.E. Cammack
(eds.), Islamic Law in contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and institutions, 146- 169. Cambridge
(Mass): Harvard University Press.
Cammack, M.E., Donovan, H. & T. Heaton (2007), ‘Islamic divorce law and practice in
Indonesia’, in R.M. Feener & M.E. Cammack (eds.), Islamic Law in Contemporary
Indonesia: Ideas and institutions, 99-127. Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press.
Cribb, R. & C. Brown (1997), Modern Indonesia: A history since 1945. London: Longman.
Debating (2003), ‘Debating polygamy’s resurgence: Indonesians divided over meaning of
Koran’, The Washington Post, dated 28 November.
Dekker, A. & H. van Katwijk (1993), Recht en rechtspraak in Nederlands-Indië. Leiden: kitlv
Uitgeverij.
Dijk, C. van (ed.) (1988), Islam en politiek in Indonesië. Muiderberg: Coutinho.
Economist (2008), ‘Where “soft Islam” is on the march’, Economist 386 (Issue 8562): 35-36.
Esposito, J.L & D. Mogahed (2007) Who speaks for Islam? What a billion Muslims really think.
Based on Gallup’s World Poll the largest study of its kind. New York: Gallup Press.
Graaf, H.J. de (1949), Geschiedenis van Indonesië. ’s-Gravenhage/Bandoeng: Uitgeverij W. van
Hoeve.
Hefner, R. (2003), ‘Islamizing capitalism: On the founding of Indonesia’s first Islamic bank’,
in A. Salim & A. Azra (eds.), Shari’a and politics in modern Indonesia, 148-167. Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Hisyam, M. (2001), Caught between three fires: The Javanese Pangulu under the Dutch colonial
administration, 1882-1942. Leiden: PhD thesis, Leiden University.
Hooker, M.B. (2003), Indonesian Islam: social change through contemporary fatawa. Crows
Nest: Allen & Unwin.
Huntington, S. (1998), The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order. New York:
Touchstone.
Ichwan, M. (2007), ‘The Politics of Shari’atization: Central governmental and regional dis-
courses of Shari’a implementation in Aceh’, in R.M. Feener & M.E. Cammack (eds.),
488 JAN MICHIEL OTTO
Islamic law in contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and institutions, 193-215. Cambridge (Mass):
Harvard University Press.
Ka’bah, R. (2007), ‘Islamic law in court decisions and fatwa institutions in Indonesia’, in R.
M. Feener & M.E. Cammack (eds.), Islamic law in contemporary Indonesia. Ideas and
Institutions, 83-98. Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press.
Lev, D. (1962), The Supreme Court and adat inheritance law in Indonesia, American Journal
of Comparative Law 11:205-224.
Lev, D. (1972), Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A study in the political bases of legal institutions.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lindsey, T. & M.B. Hooker (2007), ‘Sharia Revival in Aceh’, in R.M. Feener & M.E.
Cammack (eds.), Islamic law in contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and institutions, 216-256.
Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press.
Lindsey, T. (2008), ‘When words fail. Syariah law in Indonesia: Revival, reform or transplan-
tation?’, in P.Nicholson & S. Bidolph (eds.), Examining practices, interrogating theory:
Asian comparative legal studies, 196-220. Leiden: Brill.
Mawardi, A.I. (2003), ‘The political backdrop of the enactment of the compilation of Islamic
laws in Indonesia’, in A. Salim & A. Azra (eds.), Shari’a and Politics in Modern Indonesia,
125-147. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Mulia, S.M. (2007), ‘Towards a just marriage law: Empowering Indonesian women through
a counter legal draft to the Indonesian compilation of Islamic law’ in R. M. Feener & M.
E. Cammack (eds.), Islamic law in contemporary Indonesia. Ideas and Institutions, 128-145.
Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press.
nu (2003), ‘NU rejects Sharia for criminal code’, The Jakarta Post, dated 11 October.
Otto, J.M., A. Dekker & C. de Waaij (1994), ‘Indonesian law and administration as reflected
in 150 years of Bijdragen’, Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde 150(4): 728-754.
Otto, J.M. & S. Pompe (1988), ‘Islamitisch recht in Indonesie¨. Inlijsting van de shari’a in het
huidige nationale huwelijksrecht’, Recht van de Islam 6, 9-23, Maastricht: rimo.
Otto, J.M. (2009a), ‘Islam, family law and constitutional context in Indonesia’, in E. Cotran
& M. Lau (eds.) (2009), Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law (2006-2007) 13: 73-
86. Leiden/Boston: Brill.
Otto, J.M. (2009b), ‘The gradual incorporation of Islamic law in Indonesia’s national legal
system’, in H. Purgstall (ed.), Family, law and religion. Debates in the Muslim World and
Europe and their implications for co-operation and dialogue, 131-156, Austrian Association
for the Middle East, Oberwart: Gro¨bner Druck.
Noer, D. (1978), Administration of Islam in Indonesia, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.
Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University.
Nurlaelawati, E. (2010), Modernization, Tradition and Identity: The Kompilasi Hukum Islam and
Legal Practice in the Indonesian Religious Courts. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University
Press.
Pompe, S. (1994), ‘Between crime and custom: Extra-marital sex in modern Indonesian
law’, Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde 150(1): 110-122.
Pompe, S. (1991), ‘A short note on some recent developments with regard to mixed mar-
riages in Indonesia’, Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde, 147(2/3): 261-272.
Ricklefs, M. (1981), A history of modern Indonesia. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.
Salim, A. (2003), ‘Epilogue. Shari’a in Indonesia’s current transition: An update’, in A.
Salim & A. Azra (eds.), Shari’a and politics in modern Indonesia, 213-232. Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Salim, A. (2008), Challenging the secular state: The Islamization of law in modern Indonesia.
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Salim, A. & A. Azra (eds.) (2003a), Shari’a and politics in modern Indonesia. Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
SHARIA AND NATIONAL LAW IN INDONESIA 489
Salim, A. & A. Azra (2003b) ‘Introduction: The state and shari’a in the perspective of
Indonesian legal politics’, in A. Salim & A. Azra, Shari’a and politics in modern Indonesia,
1-16. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Schwarz, A. (1999), A nation in waiting: Indonesia’s search for stability. New South Wales:
Allen & Unwin.
Smidt, J.Th. de (1990), Recht overzee: Een uitdaging. Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink.
Snouck Hurgronje, C. (1893), De Atjèhers: 1893-1894. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
Sumner, C. (2008), Providing justice to the justice seeker: A report on the Indonesian Religious
Courts, acccess and equity study. Jakarta: Mahkamah Agung and AusAID.
Vollenhoven, C. van (1918), Het adatrecht van Nederlandsch-Indie¨. Eerste deel. Leiden: E.J.
Brill.
Wahid, A.(2009), Ilusi negara Islam: Ekspansi gerakan Islam transnasional di Indonesia. Jakarta:
The Wahid Foundation a.o.
490 JAN MICHIEL OTTO
